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This work simulates the behavior of a price, quota and regional cartel in terms of indicators 
such as price, capacity and rate of return.  As a first step the specific behavior patterns of each 
cartel are indicated in a graphical analysis before a comparison to a competitive benchmark 
has been implemented. In a second step simulation data has been applied to the System of 
Cartel Markers (SCM) invented by Blanckenburg and Geist. The SCM uses empirical 
correlation and stationarity of indicators to provide empirical evidence for cartel behavior. For 
the simulated cartel data the SCM delivered consistent results which underline its 













“People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the 
conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public or in some contrivance to raise prices.”
1 
 
What  Adam Smith pointed out precisely more than 150 years ago, can continuously be 
observed in articles on prosecuted cartels in nowadays newspapers around the globe. 
This work is a contribution to the further development on detecting cartels through empirical 
evidence. It applies the System of Cartel Markers, SCM, on simulated cartel data to illustrate 
a method of detecting cartels through market process patterns which can be observed during 
market disequilibria.  
Previous approaches on cartel detection where always based on comparative-static 
equilibrium models, for example see Harrington (2006). But static equilibrium models face a 
certain weakness - their assumptions. It is assumed that after a short adjustment period 
markets always return to equilibrium.  An existing cartel however,  will cause disequilibria of 
supply and demand on a market, which could be miss interpreted through a static model as a 
new equilibrium, after an adjustment period. Such problems will be avoided once one refuses 
the assumption, that through adjustment, markets will always lead them self to short or mid-
term equilibrium.
2 
One should rather consider a market process model, modelling disequilibria and so the 
deviation from cartel and competitive pricing enforced by the cartels capacity under 
utilization. Such a model has been founded by Grossekettler (1985) for industrial economic 
purposes. The model distinguishes five different interacting processes: market clearing, rate of 
return normalisation, superiority erosion, and product and operations process. Those processes 
can be described as control loops which are used to conclude from a negatively regenerated 
control variable (for example “excess demand” x
e = x
d – x
s) and a manipulated variable (for 
example “price change” Δp) to a competitive equilibrium after several adjustment rounds 
(within a ending time horizon t).  
                                                 
1 Smith, A. (1840). 
2 Samuelson, P.A (1941).    2
This so called “Coordination Failure Diagnostics” concept has been further developed by 
Grossekettler(2009a) and his students in order to show the above mentioned processes in 
reality time series. Blanckenburg (2009) demonstrated how the regenerating parameters can 
be econometrically determined. He developed a pattern that allows measuring the dynamics of 
market actions and subsequently evaluating its functionality. Geist (2010) demonstrates this, 
in his results for the German chemical industry. 
This work however will use the indicators determined within the market clearing and rate of 
return normalization process for cartel simulation. The market clearing process aims for a 
permanent equalized supply and demand relation on a market to prevent first, time lags in 
delivery and stock shortages caused by an excess demand and second, the inefficient use of 
resources through overproduction and so excess quantities in stock caused by excess supply.  
According to Dönnebrink (1994) and Lorenz (2006) the market clearing process can be seen 
as a short term process since it focuses on variables (indicators) such as price, price change 
and capacity utilisation deviations which tend to be rather volatile over time
3. 
The rate of return normalization process aims for minimization of positive and negative rate 
of return deviations as a cause of capacity utilisation. Capacity adjustments in production 
should only be justified in case of efficiency improvements in production process.  
In opposite to the market clearing process the rate of return normalisation process can be seen 
as a long term processes, since capacity adjustments and so rate of return changes tend to have 
a rather longer time horizon then price changes
4. 
Previous experiences with such empirical market processes have shown that the appearance of 
disequilibria is much more common than actual equilibriums and that market processes are a 
lot slower as comparative-static models implicit them to be. This causes empirical correlation 
which now can be used for cartel detection. In general, one can say that every cartel leaves its 
marks on each by Grossekettler  introduced market processes (like the tendency for a 
permanent capacity underutilization). This leads to Grossekettlers description of a “cartel 
syndrome” characterized by “cartel markers” which shows the negative effects on each of the 
above named processes for the economy during cartel activity (For example the waste of 
capacity). Once a marked shows these “cartel syndromes” one can conclude by the “disease 
syndromes” the probability for a hidden cartel. On this base Lorenz (2006) developed a 
market screening for hidden cartels. Blanckenburg and Geist have further developed Lorenz 
idea by introducing markers which relate to the M- and R- process and so created “The 
System of Cartel Markers” (SCM). The SCM can be seen as a testing method, detecting 
                                                 
3 For further description see Grossekettler (2009b). 
4 For further description see Grossekettler (2009c).   3
collusive behaviour through markers within the M and R process. It is also able to classify 
whether the cartel is just in its formation phase or already an established cartel. The 
distinction is needed since single process patterns in each phase require a different 
interpretation. So far, the SCM includes prices, capacity utilization, rates of return and 
capacity growth rates as markers. Blanckenburg and Geist (2010) 
 
The structure of this paper will be as followed first, an approach to generalize and distinguish 
between different cartel types, second to simulate different cartel types during “market 
clearing” and “rate of return normalisation” process and third to prove the during the 
simulation received results through the SCM testing method.  
 
 
2. Introduction and description of cartel types 
 
2.1 General alleged cartel behaviour 
“If a large number of producers wish to escape the rigors of competition, they must do so by 
forming an agreement to act together (called a cartel, after their German name) or by actually 
merging into one firm.”
5 
Throughout the literature one will find the oligopolistic markets as typical cartel markets 
where a few companies supply the whole marked. Ideally such a market is a competitive 
market, where the marginal costs are equal to the price paid and only short term disequilibria 
can be observed since the marked strives after short adjustments for equilibriums of supply 
and demand. However, what characterizes oligopolistic markets in general is the homogeneity 
level of the supplied goods. A high homogeneity level creates a lack of substitution between 
goods, which increases the possibility of abuse by market participants to increase prices or 
assert supply shortages because of the not existing substitution possibilities of the customers. 
Examples fur such goods are concrete or fertilizer, Dönnebrink (1994, p. 26). 
Another market given or unconsciously governmentally promoted reason for establishing a 
cartel would be low price elasticity in demand for a certain good. In such case, a price 
increase by the cartel, would have to be accepted by demanders, since goods with a low price 
elasticity of demand tend to have hardly any substitution possibilities to avoid the price 
                                                 
5 See. Stiegler, (1987), page 230.    4
increase. Such market circumstances facilitate collusive behaviour and may lead to a cartel 
market.  
Cartels may also be facilitated through market entry barriers such as high entry investments 
which are likely to be irreversible. This makes is harder for new comers to enter the market 
since in case of failure of the market entry the new comer’s entry costs become sunk costs. 
Connor (2007) states an overview of such entry barriers. 
Also to mention is the importance of a high market share in order to establish a working cartel 
Dönnebrink (1994). Through collusion gained market share regulates the power of non cartel 
market participants. 
If the cartel achieves a rather insignificant market share, it will hardly be able to enforce 
prices above competition level, and so not be able to stay on the market. In general, one can 
say that cartels abuse certain market circumstances to pursuit a utility increase which will be 
revealed by higher revenues compared to a competitive benchmark. 
It is also due to the market circumstances what kind of a cartel will develop on the particular 
market. Dönnebrink (1994) relates the cartel type to the parameter which makes companies 
merge to a cartel. As an example Dönnebrink  states, price, terms, standards or discount 
cartels. However, one should also take into account that cartels originate on a broader level, 
which leads subsequently to production-quota and regional cartels. This work focuses on 
price, quota and regional cartels which will be simulated in section 3, after each type is 
introduced and distinguished in the following section. 
 
2.2. Description of cartel types 
2.2.1 Type 1: Price cartel with collusive investment behaviour 
Following Tirole (1988) the members of a price cartel only aim for rate of return and price 
increases for their own good. Through their cartel formation, they strive to realize 
monopolistic rents by Cournot-prices and quantities which create a consumer excess burden. 
This underlines the fact that the main issue for the impact of a price cartel is the determination 
of a price parameter. The price parameter has to be set in a way that every cartel member is 
accepting it; otherwise the stability of the cartel is threatened. Among the price parameter the 
cartel has to maintain an investment policy within its members. This ensures that each 
member only supplies the amount of goods he is allowed by the cartel and does not expand 
his capacities since such behaviour would ultimately lead to a supply increase, followed by a 
decrease in price and so to an unstable situation within the cartel which could cause its end.   5
Also to mention is the importance of a high market share in order to establish a working 
cartel. The through collusion gained market share regulates the power of non cartel market 
participants. 
Concerning both above introduced control loops, in a price cartel the market clearing 
process can be observed trough the markers, price (price changes) and capacity utilisation.  
 In the formation phase, the first step of a cartel would be to announce a binding price above 
the competition level to its members that each member has to accept. It is likely that the cartel 
continues to raise its prices until it reaches a price as close to the cournot price as possible.  
The further pricing behaviour of cartels would show a quiet static behaviour in terms of 
adjusting prices to exogenous shocks. Such behaviour follows the cartels lag of coordination, 
to react quickly to demand deviations, Blanckenburg, Geist and Kholodilin (2010, page 8)
6. 
This becomes reflected through a “staircase-shaped” distribution of the cartels absolute prices 
during the cartel phase. 
Observing the distribution of  relative price changes one will notice that, compared to 
competitive pricing behaviour, there are a lot fewer price changes (more zero-changes) during 
the cartel phase. The reason for this is again, the static behaviour to react to exogenous 
shocks, once the cartel is established. 
The above assumed investment restriction within the cartel determines basically fixed 
capacities. Since the cartel strives for monopolistic rents it will shorten the quantity supplied 
during “formation phase”, which is simply creating a situation of unutilized capacities in 
order to reach quantities which maximize their monopolistic rents.  
During “cartel phase” those unutilized capacities disable market equilibriums, since a normal 
rate of demand will always face a shortage of supply. 
Analysing the rate of return normalization process the focus is on markers such as capacity 
growth rate changes and rate of return difference. In the short run collusive behaviour is 
drawn by higher prices and supply shortages. In the long run, one can observe further 
parameters which indicate collusive behaviour such as capacity deviations and rate of return 
bias. As an example can be seen a positive demand shock; in the long run on a competitive 
market, companies will invest in further capacities to cover the excess demand. Cartels, 
however, would not have to take such investments. Through their assumed behaviour of 
seeking for Cournot prices and quantities by capacity underutilisation, they have built up 
excess capacities over time, which they will use to cover the increased demand.  Benoit and 
                                                 
6 Geroski and Jacquemin (1988) deliver empirical support for this hypothesis.   6
Krishna  (1987) state that on a long perspective all collusive equilibria involve excess 
capacities.
7 
Thinking of a capacity growth rate change marker during formation and cartel phase, one 
would assume growth rate changes on a zero level. This goes back to the just above 
mentioned behaviour of a cartel. The existing excess capacities do not force a cartel to invest 
in new capacities in case of exogenous shocks. The only exception would be if the market 
originates a permanent higher demand level. Then it would be essential for the cartel to build 
up new capacities in order to obtain its power. 
The third marker rate of return difference is probably the most common marker to detect 
collusive behaviour, Bresnaham (1991). However, it is also the one where the reasons for 
deviations are hardest to exactly identify. 
In order to use this marker, a sufficient value has to be determined which states if the level of 
the rate of return difference for a certain firm is justified or not. This can be done through a 
comparison to the rate of return difference of the industry the firm operates in. 
During the whole cartel phase excess rates of returns are expected since they are the reason 
for formation and continuance of the cartel. Dividing such excess rate in two phases, a 
conspicuous increases of rate of return difference during “formation phase” and a certainly 
higher level of rates of return during ”cartel phase” could be expected.   
But, one may also find problems identifying deviations of the rate of return difference, caused 
by other parameters which influence it. For instance, excess rates of return can also be the 
result of high market concentration of a company, which gains its high margins through 
economies of scale. See Blanckenburg and Geist (2010).  
However one has to carefully evaluate the observed data in order to judge if high rates of 




                                                 
7 Osborne and Pitchick (1987) support this assumption.   7
Table 1: Summary of alleged price cartel behaviour 
 
 
2.2.2 Type 2: Quota cartel without collusive capacity changes 
The second cartel type we distinguish is a quota cartel without collusive capacity changes.  
In terms of price and supply behaviour, such a cartel type has its origin in a price cartel 
Lorenz (2006).This concludes that for this analysis the behaviour of the quota cartel during 
“Formation” and “Cartel phase” can be assumed equal to the above explained behaviour of a 
price cartel.  
However the quota cartel distinguishes itself from a price cartel through the distribution of 
revenues. Revenues are being determined through a production quota which regulates the 
amount of goods supplied by the member to the market. 
The quotas each member receives can be on one hand linked to current existing capacities of 
the member or on the other hand to the efficiency of the production cost function. Members 
with low costs receive a higher quota, but have to give compensation payments to members 
with higher costs, Schuman, Meyer, Ströbele (1999).  
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However collusive determination of production quotas will not only be found for market 
members. One will also find industries with federal determined production quotas
8. 
This work focuses only on illegal quotas based on existing capacities. 
To illustrate the expected influence of the quota cartel on the markers within the M- and R 
Process the “Cartel phase” in Table 1.1 has to be subdivided in two phases. The behaviour of 
the quota cartel during “Formation phase” and the former “Cartel phase” (now “Cartel Phase 
I”) can be seen as identically to the behaviour of the price cartel. The newly added “Cartel 
Phase II” points out the speciality of the quota cartel. Since the amount of revenue is linked to 
current capacity, each member would have an incentive to increase his capacities over time to 
achieve higher revenues
9. This means for the Capacity growth rate change marker after 
changes on a zero level during “Cartel phase I” one would assume increasing capacity growth 
rate changes during “Cartel phase II” in order to increase the current revenues. 
As a result of extended capacities in “Cartel phase II” the Capacity utilisation rate marker is 
expected to show a further decrease of the capacity utilisation rate compared to the already 
underutilized capacities during “Cartel phase I”. 
Those extended capacities should also have a significant influence to the Rate of return 
difference marker. While continuously excess rates of return were expected during “Cartel 
phase I”, the costs for the capacity extensions lead to a decrease on a zero level for the rate of 
return difference during “Cartel phase II”. The price changes marker is assumed not be 














                                                 
8 Brown and Martin (1996) reveal the U.S.” Flue-Cured Tobacco Policy “as a federal quota cartel. 
9See Fear (2006).   9




2.2.3 Type 3: Regional cartel 
The third observed cartel type is a regional cartel. It can be specified through a territorial 
marked separation, where each member of the cartel can act as a monopoly supplier who 
enforces cournot prices and quantities in his assigned territory. A regional cartel for example 
can be operating global
10, country wide or regional
11. It just depends on, in what kind of 
region the cartel chooses to operate in. One will observe unequal prices for the supplied good 
on each assigned territory, which states price discrimination as the second negative outcome 
of a regional cartel, Lorenz (2006)  
The formation of a regional cartel can be emerged through a new product, a new patent, or 
licensed contracts which create an exclusive supplier situation.  Lorenz (2006). 
For the markers within the M and R-process, the same behaviour as seen during price cartel 
“Formation Phase” and “Cartel Phase” is assumed for the regional cartel. The only exception 
is that during “Formation” and “Cartel Phase” price changes would now be observed without 
                                                 
10 For an example of a global operating cartel see: Harrington (2006), p. 23. 
11 Schiersch and Schmidt-Ehnke (2010) reveal examples for national and regional cartels. 
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delays in opposite to the price and quota cartel. The reason for such disappearing delays could 
lie within the structure of the regional cartel. It is assumed that every member is acting like a 
monopoly in his territory, so that each single one will not have to face any price negotiations 
with other cartel members. Such circumstance would abandon the further above mentioned 
delays in price changes. 
However to point out the speciality of the regional cartel the “Cartel phase” again has to be 
split into “Cartel Phase I” and “Cartel phase II” simultaneous to the quota cartel. Now the 
speciality within the regional cartel lies within the behaviour of downsizing existing 
capacities for an increase of revenues once the cartel member feels that his market power is 
unthreatened. This would cause decreasing Capacity growth rate changes during “Cartel 
phase II” while during “Phase I” changes on a zero level are expected. 
Such a downsizing of capacities would ultimately create an increase of the capacity 
utilisation rate in “Phase II” until a new targeted capacity utilisation level is reached. From 
there one would expect changes around this new utilization level. 
Finally also the rate of return difference marker in “Phase II” would be influenced by 
downsized capacities through cost reduction and efficiency improvements. Therefore a further 
increase of the rate of return level compared to “Cartel phase I” is assumed until a new 
maximum rate of return, based on the new capacities, is reached. 
 
   11




2.2.4 Competitive Market 
As a benchmark to the just described cartel types, a competitive market is chosen. The market 
can be seen as totally contestable, with no market entry barriers. Further is assumed that after 
a short adjustment period, the market will always return to equilibrium of supply and demand. 
The market allows fully transparency, about product quality and price. The price for the 
supplied good is equal to the marginal costs. 
For the markers within the M and R-process, the following behavior is expected during the 
whole study. 
Throughout the time horizon many price changes with a high distribution are expected, since 
the suppliers are able and willing to react to demand changes quiet quickly in order to sell 
their supplied quantities. 
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The capacity utilization rate is also expected to react quickly to demand changes with a high 
distribution. 
For the capacity growth rate, changes around zero level are expected, while most capacity 
changes can be explained through market entries and exits, one hast to take in to account, that 
in reality autonomous capacity growth rates occur which will be  neglected for this study. 
Also regarding the rate of return difference, changes on a zero level are expected, since the 
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3. Simulation of Cartel Types 
3.1 General 
In order to proof the above made assumptions for the each marker within the M and R-
process, each cartel type will become simulated through a self made data panel. (See table II, 
III and IV appendix). In the end a competitive benchmark will be simulated in order to create 
a comparison between cartel and competitive marked behaviour
12. 
The created data states price indices from a fictional industry. Beginning with p=100 as base 
year, it pictures absolute and relative change rates of the assumed prices. The time horizon the 
data has been simulated goes over 12 years, while changes have been taken into account on 
monthly bases. This totals 144 month of observation points. 
As explained in section 2, the observed time horizon will be separated into different phases to 
analyze and point out the behaviour and specification of each cartel type. 
 
3.2 Type I: Price cartel 
 
3.2.1 Simulation of price change  
Regarding the price cartel the following behaviour of the price change marker was expected 
in the description of the cartel type above. 
 
•  A cartel increases its prices striving for the cournot level.   
 
•  Static and delayed behaviour by adjusting prices to exogenous shocks 
 
•  Few price changes during cartel phase 
 








                                                 
12 Rudolph (2009) examined through simulation the stability of the M and R-process.   14
                                                   Price 
                 
                                                           Figure 1, Price indices, Price cartel 
 
Looking at Figure 1 which shows the absolute price data throughout the observed time 
horizon, beginning in period zero where (p) equals 100, one will observe a high and jumpy 
increase of the cartel price until a certain level is reached. It can be assumed that the point 
where the increase stops, the cartel has reached its aimed cournot level. Such a development is 
the first evidence for a price cartel in the described “Formation phase”. Continuing the 
observation from that point, the actual “cartel phase” begins. One can clearly see that from 
there on, to the end of observations, prices changes occur but with a certain delay. This can be 
seen through a rather static behaviour of price changes compared to a more volatile behaviour 
of the price changes on a competitive market (3.5.1). The reason for such behaviour lies 
within the cartels lag to react quickly to exogenous demand changes. The plot also underlines 
the assumption of fewer price changes during cartel phase which is on one hand due to the lag 
of reaction and on the other hand to the market power the cartel has achieved through is 
collusion which makes it more resistant to exogenous shocks. 
Along and as a cause of those mentioned characteristics, the whole plot pictures clearly a 




3.2.2 Simulation of capacity utilisation rate 
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•  Suddenly shortage of supply during “formation phase”   
 
•  Underutilized capacities create supply shortages to assert the higher prices 
 
•  Cartel level of capacity utilization rate disables market equilibriums during „cartel 
phase“           
 
                       Capacity utilization rate Price cartel and Competition 
 
                                             Figure 2, Capacity utilization rate, Price cartel and competition 
 
Figure 1.1 shows the capacity utilization rate changes for a price cartel within the observed 
time horizon together with the capacity utilisation rate changes for a competitive bench mark. 
During “formation phase” a heavy decrease of capacity utilization rate can be observed which 
indicates a supply shortage, as assumed above. Comparing the capacity utilisation rate during 
“formation phase” with the price change behaviour during “formation phase” (Figure 1) one 
finds a clear correlation between an increase in price and a shortage in supply. 
Comparing now the capacity utilization rate changes from a price cartel and competitive 
benchmark during “cartel phase”, the plot shows a clear level deviation created by the cartel. 












10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
XD XD_COMP
       Formation                                  Cartel Phase
          Phase  16
3.2.3 Simulation of capacity growth rate changes 
The assumptions for the capacity growth rate changes marker during a price cartel where: 
 
•  Growth rate changes on a zero level during “formation” and “ cartel phase” 
 
 
                                                  Figure 3, Capacity growth rate changes, Price cartel 
 
Figure 3 shows clearly the above assumed behaviour of the capacity growth rate changes 
during the observed time horizon. Again, changes on a zero level occur because, already 
existing capacities are assumed fixed in a price cartel which prevents further investments in 
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3.2.4 Simulation of rate of return difference  
For the last marker, rate of return difference, was assumed: 
 
•  Increasing rates of return during “formation phase” 
 
•  A higher level of rates of return compared to a broader industry  
 
                                                    Figure 4, Rate of return difference, Price cartel 
 
Looking at Figure 4, the assumed increase of the rate of return difference can be observed 
during “formation phase” through an increase of about five percent points. The rate of return 
difference has its origin in prices and supplied quantities which are described by the price 
change and capacity utilisation rate marker. This concludes that the observed increase can be 
explained through the simultaneous increase of price changes, and decreasing capacity growth 
rate changes. 
The expected higher level of rate of return difference compared to a broader industry can be 
clearly observed from the beginning to the end of the “cartel phase”. The rate of return level 
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3.3 Type II: Quota cartel with collusive investment behaviour 
 
As also done in the description of the quota cartel (2.2.2), the behaviour in “cartel phase II” is 
the focus of the quota cartel simulation analysis. Therefore the results for “formation phase 
and “cartel phase I” can be neglected since they are similar to the results of the above 
described prise cartel results. Also the price change marker will be neglected in this analysis 
since it has a rather insignificant influence to the behaviour of a quota cartel. For a closer 
analysis of the “cartel phase II” the observation sample has been extended to a total of 144 
observation points. 
As assumed above, the speciality of the quota cartel lies within the extension of existing 
capacities. Therefore the simulation results of the capacity growth rate change marker are the 
first to be examined. 
 
3.3.1 Simulation of capacity growth rate changes  
For the behaviour of the capacity growth rate change marker was assumed: 
 
•  During “cartel phase II”  increasing capacity growth rate changes 
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Looking at figure 5, one can observe a steady increase of the capacity growth rate change, 
which proofs the alleged behaviour of capacity extensions in order to achieve higher revenues 
within the quota cartel.  
 
3.3.2 Simulation of capacity utilization rate changes  
Since it was assumed that capacity growth rate changes directly influence capacity utilisation 
rate changes, it makes sense to next examine its impact on the capacity utilisation rate 
changes. 
 
For the capacity utilisation rate marker was assumed above: 
 
•  Further decrease during “cartel phase II” 
 
 
                                                         Figure 6, Capacity utilization rate changes, Quota cartel 
 
As expected, in figure 6 the capacity utilisation rate shows even a further decrease during 
“cartel phase II”, while already underutilized capacities where observed during “cartel phase 
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3.3.3 Simulation of rate of return difference  
The third marker where an influence of capacity extensions was expected is the rate of return 
difference marker. 
 
For the rate of return difference marker was assumed above: 
 
•  Decreasing rates of return to a zero level during “cartel phase II” 
 
 
                                                                       Figure 7, Rate of return difference, Quota cartel 
 
Also figure 7 proves the above made assumptions regarding the behaviour of the rate of return 
difference marker in a quota cartel. One can observe a moderate decrease of the rate of return 
to a zero level during “cartel phase II”. Comparing now figure 5 and 7 it is decisive that once 
the cartel begins to extend its capacity it causes a reduction of the rate of return. This 
correlation is due to the extra costs of the capacity extensions which cause a negative impact 
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3.4 Type III: Regional Cartel 
 
For the results of the regional cartel simulation the analysis focuses, simultaneous to the quota 
cartel, on “cartel phase II”, while “formation” and “cartel phase I” can be seen as equal to the 
already described price cartel. The only to mention difference is that, due to the independence 
of each suppler in his alleged region price changes occur without delays, since the cartel 
member can assert price changes by himself. This can be seen through the more volatile 
behaviour of the price changes compared to the price and quota cartel. (Figure 8) 
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3.4.1 Simulation of capacity growth rate changes  
The initial point for the quota cartel simulation analysis is the capacity growth rate. 
It was assumed above that a cartel member who feels unthreaded in his market power is 
downsizing his existing capacities. 
 
Therefore the assumption for the capacity growth rate change marker was:  
 
•  Decreasing capacity growth rate changes during “Cartel phase II” 
 
 
                                                          Figure 9, Capacity growth rate changes, Regional cartel 
 
Figure 9 proves clearly the in the description made assumption, that at a certain point regional 
cartels begin to downsize their capacities. One can observe this through a continuous decrease 
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3.4.2 Simulation of capacity utilization rate changes 
As already described in the simulation of the quota cartel, changes of the capacity growth rate 
have a direct influence on the capacity utilisation rate. 
 
For the capacity utilisation rate marker was assumed: 
 
•  An increase of the capacity utilisation rate in “Phase II” 
 
 
                                                    Figure 10, Capacity utilization rate changes, Regional cartel 
 
By looking at figure 10 the assumed influence becomes clearly proven. As a cause of the 
capacity downsizing of the cartel, one can observe a sudden increase of the capacity 
utilisation rate at the beginning of “cartel phase II”. After that, the utilization rate continues on 
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3.4.3 Simulation of Rate of return difference 
The rate of return difference marker displays the actual reason for the downsizing of 
capacities. 
 
For the rate of return difference marker was assumed above: 
 
•  Further increase in “cartel phase II” compared to “phase I” 
 
 
                                                                  Figure 11, Rate of return difference, Regional cartel 
 
 
The assumed increase of the rate of return difference during “cartel phase II” becomes 
verified through figure 11. One observes a steady increase of the rate of return difference as a 
result of downsizing capacities by the regional cartel. The increase will come to an end once 
the new maximum rate of return difference, based on existing capacities, is reached. 
As one can conclude now, the regional cartel uses the downsizing of capacities for increasing 
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3.5 Simulation of a competitive benchmark  
 
3.5.1 Simulation of price changes 
 The results for the simulation of a competitive market have to be seen as a benchmark for the 
different cartel types. The behaviour of each marker displays how the marked is originally 
supposed to work in terms of each marker.  
 
For the price change marker, many price changes with a high distribution where expected. 
                                                                                                                                            
 
                                                                                        Figure 12 Price, Competition 
 
Figure 12 displays the above assumed price changes with a high distibution. As one can see 
the price changes stay on the same level throughout the whole observation unlike in a cartel 
where it raises to a higer level during formation phase and and continues on that new level 
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3.5.2 Simulation of the capacity growth rate  
The capacity utilization rate was expected to react quickly to demand changes with a high 
utilization distribution. 
 
                                                                             Figure 13, Capacity growth rate, Competition 
 
Observing figure 13 the above assumed distribution of the capacity utilisation rate becomes 
verified through the behaviour of the marker throughout all three phases. As a comparison the 
capacity utilisation rate of all three described cartel types, decreases during formation phase 
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3.5.3 Simulation of the capacity growth rate change  
For the capacity growth rate, changes around zero level where expected. 
 
 
                                                                Figure 14, Capacity growth rate change, Competition                         
 
 
The simulation of the capacity growth rate verifies the assumed behaviour in figure 14 
Throughout the observation, changes on a zero level can be observed for a competitive 
market. As a comparison one could observe continuously decreasing capacity growth rate 






















25 50 75 100 125
Capacity growth rate change
Formation            Cartel Phase I                         Cartel Phase II
  Phase  28
3.5.4 Simulation of the rate of return difference  
The rate of return difference was expected to fluctuate on a zero level during the whole 
observation. 
 




For the last marker simulation also verifies the assumed behavior in figure 15. The changes 
for the competitive benchmark occur on a zero level, while for the price cartel increasing, the 
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4. Empirical Analysis „cartels vs. competition“ 
 
4.1 Testing methods  
In section 3 was found proof for the assumed behaviour of each cartel type by analyzing the 
behaviour of the simulation outputs. Section 4 is now going to extend the visual proof to an 
empirical proof by testing the simulation results for their significance and correlation. 
Blanckenburg and Geist (2009) developed indicators for such a testing method in their 
System of Cartel Markers (SCM). 
In the following, indicators, testing methods and expected results will be briefly introduced. 
 
a) Utilization of capacities 
For the utilisation rate of capacities the Augmented Dickey-Fuller-Test (ADF-Test) will be 
used. It tests stationary of a variable for a determined time horizon, with Ho: “Variable has a 
unit root“. Variables have been tested for zero stationary and/or. intercept stationary. 
In order to analyze the behaviour of each marker in case of denying Ho, a trend test has been 
made to examine in which direction the utilization rate is going to develop. 
 








                                                                                              
 
 
b) Correlation between utilization rate of capacities and price changes 
 
The test is supposed to point out the influence of changes in the capacity utilization rate on 
price changes. It is assumed that exogenous shocks cause first capacity utilization 
adjustments, which then again cause price changes. For the test the following regression 
equation is assumed:      
 




Phase                    Expected behaviour 
Cartel formation  Negative trend 
Cartel  Negative trend or intercept stationary 
Competitive Stationarity     30











c) Rate of return difference 
 
As already seen for the utilization of capacities, the rate of return difference will also be tested 
with the ADF-Test pattern, for intercept stationary, zero stationary and a trend. 
 








d) Correlation between rate of return difference and capacity growth rate changes. 
 
Analog to the testing idea in b) the correlation of rate of return difference and capacity growth 
rate changes is supposed to show whether the rate of return difference has a significant 
influence on the capacity growth rate or not. This follows the assumption, that high rates of 
return on a competitive market attract newcomers, which leads in total to an increasing 
capacity growth rate of the market. If not, the observed market can be seen as a cartel market. 
 












Phase                    Expected behaviour 
Cartel formation  Independency or negative correlation 
Cartel  Positive correlation (but lower adjustment speed) 
Competitive Positive  correlation 
 
Phase                    Expected behaviour 
Cartel formation  Positive trend 
Cartel  Not zero stationary 
Competitive Stationarity   
 
Phase                    Expected behaviour 
Cartel formation  No correlation 
Cartel  No positive correlation ( negative correlation in 
Type II and III , no correlation in Type I) 
Competitive Positive  correlation   31
e) Distribution of nominal price changes 
 
The price change density is expected to be significantly higher for a cartel market than for a 
competitive benchmark. V. Blanckenburg and Geist used the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to 
examine the behavior of the price changes density. For a deeper analysis see: “ The influence 
of collusion on price changes: New evidence from major cartel cases.” 
 
f) Variance of capacity growth rate changes 
 
The variance of capacity growth rate changes is tested by a test of variance equality for the 
capacity growth rate changes of a cartel and a competitive benchmark. It is assumed that the 
variance for capacity growth rate changes is significantly lower for cartels than for a 
competitive benchmark because in general cartels are less likely to downsize or expand their 
capacity rather then adjusting their capacity utilization level. 
 






























Phase                    Expected behaviour 
Cartel formation  Variance competition  > Variance cartel 
Cartel Variance  competition   > Variance cartel 
Competitive --   32
4.2 Empirical results  
 
4.2.1 Type I: Price cartel 
 









    
 
a) Utilization rate of 
capacities 
      1.04     
     0.01 ;      0.89  
 
Xd is not zero stationary 
(p = 0.8672) 
 
Xd is not intercept stationary 
 (p= 0.2721) 
 
Xd has a negative trend 
 
 
      0.0244     
     0.2828 ;      0.02  
 
Xd is not zero stationary 
(p = 0.5219) 
 
Xd is intercept stationary 
(p = 0.0910) 
 
Xd does not have a negative trend 
    
b) Correlation 
between utilization 
rate of capacities and 
price changes 
∆    0.9   0.002   
 
Δp and Xd are independent 
(    0.36  ;      0.97  
 
∆    3.81   0.181   
     0.03 ;     0.028  
 
Δp and Xd are positive correlated 
    
 
c) Rate of return 
difference 
     0.8762  
     0.26     
     0.01 ;      0.905  
 
Rd is not zero stationary 
 
Rd is not intercept stationary 
 (p = 0.6037) 
 
Rd has a positive trend 
    5 . 0 5 0 . 0 0 6   
   0 . 0 0    ;     0.2626  
 
Rd is not zero stationary 
(p = 0.5265) 
 
Rd  is intercept stationary 
(p = 0.0107) 
 
Rd does not have a trend 
    
d) Correlation 
between rate of return 
difference and 
capacity growth rate 
changes 
     0.9469  
 





Rd has no influence on dW 
(p = 0.7577) 
  
 




See  von Blanckenburg  and Geist  
    
 
f) Variance of 
capacity growth rate 
changes 
 
Higher variance for competitive 
benchmark 
Std.Dev.comp = 0.9968 
vs. 
Std.Dev.cart = 0.0108 
 
 
Higher variance for competitive 
benchmark 
Std.Dev.comp = 0.9473 
vs. 
Std.Dev.cart = 0.019   33
Table 9 shows the empirical results for the first cartel type, the price cartel. As already seen in 
the simulation of the cartel types, the observation sample has been subdivided into formation 
and cartel phase. Each phase has been tested separately for each indicator a) - f).  
 
a)  Utilization rate of capacities 
One finds clear evidence for the assumed negative trend of the capacity utilisation rate 
during “formation phase”, which underlines the cartels behaviour of under utilizing  
capacities during its formation. This creates a situation of excess demand which makes it 
easier to assert the increased cartel prices. The during cartel phase assumed intercept 
stationarity of the utilization rate becomes also proven in table 9 This goes back to the 
achievement of the new targeted capacity utilisation level which is certainly lower 
compared to a competitive benchmark 
 
b)  Correlation between utilization rate of capacities and price changes 
During “formation phase” the assumed independency of price changes and capacity 
utilisation rate is verified by the results of table 9 The independency of the two markers 
states the typical cartel behaviour of increasing prices and reducing quantities, during 
formation face, independently from any exogenous shocks. One also observes the 
assumed positive correlation during “cartel phase” by a positive and significant Xd. The 
positive correlation points out the cartels reaction to demand changes with delayed price 
changes.  
 
c)  Rate of return difference  
The results for the rate of return difference in table 9 state a positive trend of the rate of 
return difference during “formation phase”. The result fits the expected behaviour of 
increasing rates of return during cartel formation. For the “cartel phase” intercept 
stationarity can be observed which underlines the assumption of continuously higher rate 
of return level compared to a competitive bench mark, where one would observe zero 
stationarity. Table I: appendix  
 
d)   Correlation between rate of return difference and capacity growth rate 
While throughout a competitive market a positive correlation of can be found, since 
higher rates of return attract new companies to the market, table 9 proofs a different 
behaviour for “formation” and “cartel phase” of a cartel market. Here one finds in both   34
phases no correlation between rate of return difference and capacity growth rate. One 
reason for that would be that the market contains entry barriers which scare new comers to 
enter the market. Another reason can be found in the alleged price cartel behaviour. It was 
assumed that the cartel operates with fixed capacities; therefore there cannot be any 
correlation between the both markers. However one should expect that the higher rates of 
return are due to the monopolistic pricing behaviour of the cartel. 
 
e)  Distribution of price changes 
Not processed, see above. 
 
f)  Variance of capacity growth rate changes 
Table    9 also proves the above made assumption for the variances of a cartel, compared 
to a competitive benchmark. One finds for “formation” and “cartel phase” a certainly 
higher variance for the competitive benchmark. Such a low variance indicates a cartel 
market with fixed capacities. Therefore it can be assumed that cartels only react to 
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Table 10 Test results on applied Quota cartel simulation data 
 
 Formation  Phase 
Sample 1-24 
Cartel Phase I 
Sample 25-84 
Cartel Phase II 
Sample 85-144 
      
a) Utilization rate of 
capacities 
      1.04     
     0.01 ;      0.89  
Xd is not zero stationary 
(p = 0.8672) 
 
Xd is not intercept stationary 
(p = 0.2721) 
 
Xd has a negative trend 
      0.0244     
     0.2828 ;      0.02  
Xd is not zero stationary 
(p = 0.5219) 
 
Xd is intercept stationary 
(p = 0.0910) 
 
Xd does not have a negative 
trend        1.28   0.2263     
     0.626  ;     0.000  
Xd is not zero stationary 
(p=0.8216) 
 
Xd is not intercept stationary 
(p=0.3882) 
 
Xd has a negative trend 
 
 
      
b) Correlation 
between utilization 
rate of capacities 
and 
price changes 
∆    0.9   0.002   
Δp and Xd are independent 
(    0.36  ;      0.07  
       0.03 ;     0.028  
Δp and Xd are positive 
correlated 
∆    3.81   0.181    
∆    1.89   0.07      
     0.1742 ;    0.1672  
Δp and Xd are independent 
 
 
c) Rate of return 
difference 
     0.8762  
     0.26     
     0.01 ;      0.905  
 
Rd is not zero stationary 
 
Rd is not intercept stationary (p 
= 0.6037) 
 
Rd has a positive trend 
 
     5.05   0.006     
     0.00  ;     0.2626  
 
Rd is not zero stationary 
(p = 0.5265) 
 
Rd  is intercept stationary 
(p = 0.0107) 
 
Rd does not have a trend 
     12.153   0.086     
     0.000 ;     0.000  
 
Rd has a unit root 
(p= 0.0839) 
 
Rd is not intercept stationary 
(p=0.6453) 
 




between rate of 
return 
difference and 
capacity growth rate 
changes 
     0.9469  
 
 




Rd has no influence on dW 
(p = 0.7577)       10.25   1.833     
 
 
Rd has a negative influence on dW 
(p=0.000 ; p=0.000) 
 
  
e) Distribution of 
price changes 
 
See von Blanckenburg and Geist 
 
f) Variance of 




Higher variance for competitive 
benchmark 
Std.Dev.comp = 0.9968 
vs. 
Std.Dev.cart = 0.0108 
 
 
Higher variance for 
competitive benchmark 
Std.Dev.comp = 0.9473 
vs. 
Std.Dev.cart = 0.019 
 
 
Higer variance for the cartel 
Std.Dev.comp = 2.4127 
vs. 
Std.Dev.cart = 3.4519   36
As also proceeded during the quota cartel simulation analysis, the description of its  
empirical results focus on the added “cartel phase II” and neglect the results for 
“formation” and “cartel phase I”, since they are equal to the before analyzed price cartel.  
Further one should have in mind, that among other things the quota cartel was 
characterized through increasing capacity growth rates during “cartel phase II” in order to 
obtain higher cartel revenues. 
 
a)  Utilization rate of capacities 
Looking at table 10 one will find a highly significant negative trend of the capacity 
utilisation rate during “cartel phase II” which is typical for the quota cartel. It can be 
explained through the increasing capacity growth rate during “phase II” which 
consequently leads to further decrease of the already underutilized capacity utilization. 
 
b)  Correlation between utilization rate of capacities and price changes. 
Table 10 states independence for utilization rate and price changes, while a positive 
correlation was expected. The deviation from the expected behaviour can be explained 
through the interdependency of capacity utilisation, capacity growth and price 
changes. The increase of capacities draws harder on the capacity utilisation, then 
exiguous demand shocks. This can be seen as a bias of the assumed testing results for 
the correlation between utilization rate of capacities and price changes.  
 
c)  Rate of return difference 
By looking at the of return difference indicator throughout “cartel phase II” one can 
observe a highly significant negative trend in table 10 The increasing capacities cause 
additional costs leading to a significant reduction of the rate of return difference which 
can be concluded through the negative trend. 
 
d)  Correlation between rate of return difference and capacity growth rate  
What has been already mentioned in c) and assumed above becomes now proven 
through the correlation indicator of rate of return difference and capacity growth rate. 
Table 10 displays a negative influence from the rate of return difference on capacity 
growth rate, which makes sense once one thinks of the behaviour of both markers in 
the simulation analysis. The rate of return has to have a negative impact on capacity   37
growth in order to create increasing capacity growth rates while the rate of return 
difference decreases. 
 This becomes obvious once one inverts the created regression equation to Rd. 
     5.59   0.545   
The equation shows clearly the negative impact of the capacity growth rate on the rate 
of return difference.  
 
d)  Distribution of price changes 
Not processed, see above. 
 
e)  Variance of capacity growth rate changes 
In opposite to the expected behaviour one can observe a higher variance for the cartel   
compared to the competitive bench mark. This can simply be explained through the 
typical increase of the capacities during “phase II” in a quota cartel, while on a 
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4.2.3 Type 3: Regional cartel 
 
 
Table 11: Test results on applied Regional cartel simulation data 
 Formation  Phase 
Sample 1-24 
Cartel Phase I 
Sample 25-84 
Cartel Phase II 
Sample 85-144 
a) Utilization rate 
of 
capacities 
      1.0134     
     0.01 ;      0.923 
 
Xd is not zero stationary 
(p = 0.9493) 
 
Xd is not intercept stationary 
(p = 0.3911) 
 
Xd has a negative trend 
 
      0.0338     
     0.1517 ;      0.03  
 
Xd is not zero stationary 
(p = 0.5611) 
 
Xd is intercept stationary 
(p = 0.0447) 
 
Xd does not have a negative trend 
      26.94   0.153     
     0.00 ;     0 . 3 0   
 




Xd is intercept stationary 
(p= 0.0905) 
 







rate of capacities 
and 
price changes 
∆    1.346   0.03477   
 
Δp and Xd are independent 
 
(    0.0813  ;      0.4758  
 
∆    5.455   0.2603   
     0.0053 ;     0.0047  
 
Δp and Xd are positive correlated 
  ∆    1.3478   0.1361   
     0.0310 ;     0.0199  
 




c) Rate of return 
difference       0.9493  
     0.25     
     0.01 ;      0.922  
 
 
Rd is not zero stationary 
 
Rd is not intercept stationary (p = 
0.3911) 
 
Rd has a positive trend 
 
      0.008     
     0.1517  ;      0.03511  
 
 
Rd is not zero stationary 
(p = 0.4835) 
 
Rd  is intercept stationary 
(p = 0.0447) 
 
Rd does not have a trend 
     0.0689     
     0.01 ;      0.711  
 
 
Rd is not zero stationary 
(p= 0.9137) 
 
Rd  is not intercept stationary 
(p= 0.6558) 
 
Rd has a positive trend 
d) Correlation 






     0.7659  
 
 
Rd has no influence on dW 
 
      0.0059    
 
 
Rd has a negative influence on dW 
 
(p = 0.096 ;      0.047  
      2.0651    
 
 
Rd has a negative influence on dW 
 
p = 0.000 ;      0.713  
  
e) Distribution of 
price changes 
See von Blanckenburg and Geist 
 






Higher variance for competitive 
benchmark 
Std.Dev.comp = 0.9968 
vs. 
Std.Dev.cart = 0.0129 
 
 
Higher variance for competitive 
benchmark 
Std.Dev.comp = 0.947 
vs. 
Std.Dev.cart = 0.021 
 
 
Higher variance for the cartel 
Std.Dev.cart = 3.4917 
vs. 
Std.Dev.comp = 0.9554 
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The empirical results for the regional cartel can be found in table 11the main focus for the 
analysis lies again on “cartel phase II” since it shows the speciality of the regional cartel. Here 
one should have in mind, that price changes occur more often and less delayed, and that the 
cartel will begin to downsize its capacities at a point where it feels unthreaded. 
 
a)  Utilization rate of capacities 
By looking at the results for “cartel phase II” on will notice that two of the expected 
results do not fit to the expected behaviour. One finds zero and intercept stationarity 
instead of denying both. This can be seen as weakness of the unit root test once it 
comes to more volatile data with a trend. However, what can be found is a positive 
trend just as it was expected during “phase II”  
 
b) Correlation between utilisation rate of capacities and price changes 
As indicated for a cartel, one can observe a significant positive correlation between 
capacity utilization and price changes during “phase II” in table 11. 
 
c)  Rate of return difference 
Table 11 displays a highly significant positive trend for the rate of return difference in 
“cartel phase II”. This proves the expected behaviour and is a first evidence for the 
positive impact downsizing of capacities has on the rate of return difference. 
 
d)  Correlation between rate of return difference and capacity growth rate change 
One can find the expected behaviour with a highly significant negative correlation 
between both markers in table 11. The result follows the already in c) mentioned 
connection between rate of return difference and capacity growth rate. It reflects the 
cartels goal of achieving higher rates of return through downsized capacities and so 
decreased capacity costs. Such a connection would only be observed on a cartel 
market, since on a competitive market increasing rates of return would generally 
attract new comers to the marked which would lead to increasing capacity growth rates 
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e)  Distribution of price changes 
Not processed, see above. 
 
f) Variance of capacity growth rate changes  
Also for the regional cartel in “cartel phase II” one can observe a higher variance of 
capacity growth rate changes for the cartel market than for the competitive benchmark. 
The explanation for such behaviour can be seen as equal to the quota cartel just with 






In this work the appearance of disequilibria has been used to model empirical correlation 
between market process variables such as, price, capacity and rate of return in order to find 
evidence for cartel behaviour. Therefore in a first step different cartel types were theoretically 
distinguished and in a second, their behaviour in terms of market process variables simulated. 
Those variables were defined by the System of Cartel Markers and represented, together with 
the theoretical description of each cartel type, the foundation for the cartel type simulation. 
The simulation consisted out of fictional data deducted from previously observed cartel data 
samples. In the simulation analysis was found proof for the theoretical alleged behaviour of 
the different cartel types. The specialities of each cartel could be discovered during the 
different cartel phases. To picture the undesired development, a comparison to a competitive 
benchmark was introduced.  
Finally the SCM testing pattern was applied to the generated data to detect empirical evidence 
like correlation or trends in the observed market processes which conclude the presence of a 
cartel or collusive behaviour.  
The SCM provided solid empirical proof for the presences of a cartel throughout the 
examined markers for each cartel type. Almost all of the examined markers showed at least 
significance for their previously alleged behaviour. Those good results underline, that the 
SCM can be seen as a quiet qualified tool, to detect collusive behaviour based on empirical 
data. 
This work can be used as a guideline for cartel simulations and as support for the detection of 
certain cartel types. Simulated or empirical cartels can be analysed with the methods of the   41
SCM. The introduced simulation can also be applied for other cartel types which have not 
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7. Appendix 
 







 Formation  Phase 
Sample 1-24 
Cartel Phase I 
Sample 25-84 
Cartel Phase II 
Sample 85-144 
a) Utilization rate 
of 
capacities 
      0.734   
 
Xd is zero stationary 
(p = 0.0001) 
 
Xd is intercept stationary 
(p = 0..0005) 
 
Xd does not have a trend 
 
     0.9905  
 
Xd is zero stationary 
(p = 0.0000) 
 
Xd is intercept stationary 
(p = 0.0000) 
 
Xd does not have trend 
     0.3301  
 
Xd is zero stationary 
(p= 0.000) 
 
Xd is intercept stationary 
(p= 0.000) 
 






rate of capacities 
and 
price changes 
Xd has a no influence on Δp 
(    0.000  
 
Xd has a no influence on Δp 
(    0.000  
 
Xd has a no influence on Δp 
(    0.000  
 
c) Rate of return 
difference 
     0.8651   
 
Rd is zero stationary 
(p = 0.0000) 
 
Rd is intercept stationary 
(p = 0.0004) 
 
Rd does not have a trend 
 
     0.9340   
 
Rd is zero stationary 
(p = 0.0000) 
 
Rd is intercept stationary 
(p = 0.0000) 
 
Rd does not have a trend 
 
      0.7278   
Rd is zero stationary 
(p = 0.000) 
 
Rd is intercept stationary 
(p = 0.0000) 
 
Rd does not have a trend 
 
d) Correlation 






     0.0000 ;      0.562  
 
 




     0.0000 ;      0.5530  
 
 
Rd has a positive influence on dW 
       0.0000 ;      0.4226  
 
 
Rd has a positive influence on 
dW 
 













 Higher variance for competitive 
benchmark 
Std.Dev.comp = 0.9968 
vs. 
Std.Dev.cart = 0.0129 
 
Higher variance for competitive 
benchmark 
Std.Dev.comp = 0.947 
vs. 
Std.Dev.cart = 0.021 
 
Higer variance for the cartel 
Std.Dev.cart = 3.4917 
vs. 
Std.Dev.comp = 0.9554   44
 
7.2.1 Table II. 
 
Data panel Price Cartel 
Observation P  XD  DW  RD 
1 100  0,450626465  0,002157008  -0,009993308 
2 100  -0,89146094  0,028126876  0,034352574 
3 100  0,34452148  0,003650539  -0,112083664 
4 102  -2,98460562  -0,004525683  0,53063801 
5 102  -1,475774836  0,011036747  0,338493828 
6 102  -1,525780449  0,010080759  0,406841151 
7 110  -10,60974776  -0,001038199  2,460087587 
8 110  -11,81848005  -0,001878415  2,434272371 
9 110  -10,61687967  -0,010681084  2,420330707 
10 113  -13,40634808  -0,025052269  3,329231767 
11 113  -13,97657623  -0,007761157  3,286065101 
12 113  -12,99574671  0,005370114  3,381913268 
13 113  -13,61488934  -0,003042216  3,29779879 
14 113  -12,79520654  0,020018086  3,260096436 
15 118  -17,57481187  -0,025238052  4,464399318 
16 118  -19,42862337  -0,012866375  4,438276076 
17 118  -18,30401496  -0,019507776  4,439658446 
18 118  -18,69820961  0,000675876  4,446447566 
19 122  -21,47347612  0,008805435  5,500311284 
20 122  -21,41765143  -0,004318976  5,533432744 
21 122  -21,52326962  0,034074337  5,569837137 
22 120  -20,65738385  -0,011695735  5,067629429 
23 120  -20,6563397  0,012427387  5,012506685 
24 120  -20,33990859  -0,000352946  4,980671862 
25 120  -21,74692714  0,025844823  5,000835141 
26 120  -20,42210533  0,005854346  5,091212016 
27 120  -19,75301437  0,012255002  4,902812357 
28 124  -16,30047799  0,032337326  6,009232232 
29 124  -15,56301765  -0,003804486  5,885678126 
30 124  -16,07494855  0,014880124  6,15837259 
31 123  -17,33237528  0,02004383  5,684868509 
32 123  -18,00739034  0,002850723  5,473886416 
33 121  -19,28775794  0,003273323  5,275702301 
34 117  -22,56730319  0,014489273  4,173118951 
35 117  -22,95617336  -0,026609824  4,18112153 
36 117  -24,07167175  -0,007642683  4,098022732 
37 117  -23,65130944  0,002271251  4,065121671 
38 117  -22,52076896  0,023904363  4,242152807 
39 117  -23,04797534  0,016303038  4,014893307 
40 119  -21,78016483  -0,017692423  4,841471936 
41 119  -20,49206864  -0,001665572  4,779078312 
42 119  -21,07882147  0,032519405  4,808622723 
43 119  -21,61356717  0,022921514  4,877188873 
44 119  -19,57908442  -0,005486614  4,775839467 
45 119  -21,46689829  0,041511986  4,73698747 
46 123  -17,01729116  -0,015431749  5,871778054 
47 123  -16,60748109  -0,033436077  5,693604397 
48 123  -16,86223812  0,008581893  5,824282991 
49 123  -18,8803799  -0,005567419  5,831320584   45
50 123  -17,62329001  0,005108498  5,650512098 
51 114  -25,49569079  0,001026791  3,451236567 
52 114  -26,07877742  0,015697108  3,533779338 
53 114  -26,6515342  -0,017009942  3,571993895 
54 114  -24,91096081  -0,023405491  3,530625984 
55 114  -25,41411023  -0,024678224  3,569241276 
56 114  -24,29684872  -0,010922483  3,438563548 
57 118  -22,73601451  -0,022498387  4,343329653 
58 118  -21,95314379  0,027640172  4,619823105 
59 118  -21,40929886  -0,033638893  4,507897543 
60 118  -23,42128972  -0,015328488  4,473541292 
61 120  -20,15302063  -0,023601063  4,859582975 
62 120  -19,81214521  -0,02950568  4,779766684 
63 120  -17,94563074  0,014066531  4,957180849 
64 120  -20,5451895  -0,01639189  5,000727213 
65 120  -20,6149276  -0,002195018  4,985497255 
66 115  -23,934954  -0,02000956  3,813962888 
67 115  -25,39275376  0,009082848  3,758680594 
68 115  -24,70022671  0,003368778  3,742583562 
69 115  -26,20675138  -0,011385298  3,825750634 
70 115  -25,49332534  0,006434675  3,60749026 
71 115  -25,5572636  -0,000961326  3,790422787 
72 115  -25,46288016  0,007015435  3,867348312 
73 115  -24,57850125  0,017289374  3,815649146 
74 121  -18,13395267  -0,019899046  5,261771785 
75 121  -18,27143454  -0,006368243  5,223206251 
76 121  -18,61765336  -0,04113233  5,432617237 
77 121  -19,74973038  -0,045474642  5,233239801 
78 121  -18,916194  -0,006934025  5,350394125 
79 121  -18,27619597  -0,012222814  5,415755379 
80 121  -18,59306979  -0,007653002  5,273240777 
81 121  -20,00939934  -0,01112259  5,331395108 
82 121  -21,32734729  0,017534646  5,281046547 
83 121  -19,09499967  0,009227618  5,176958131 
84 120  -19,04631613  0,001584784  4,881215873 
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7.2.2 Table III. 
 
Data panel Quota Cartel 
Observation P  XD  DW  RD 
1 100  0,45062647  0,00071782  -0,00999331
2 100  -0,89146094 -0,04018325 0,03435257 
3 100  0,34452148  0,0383135  -0,11208366
4 102  -2,98460562 0,03695884  0,53063801 
5 102  -1,47577484 0,00329437  0,33849383 
6 102  -1,52578045 0,00661782  0,40684115 
7 110  -10,6097478 0,00917047  2,46008759 
8 110  -11,81848  0,0043021  2,43427237 
9 110  -10,6168797 -0,02988697 2,42033071 
10 113  -13,4063481 0,01563242  3,32923177 
11 113  -13,9765762 0,02038469  3,2860651 
12 113  -12,9957467 -0,01588642 3,38191327 
13 113  -13,6148893 0,02326053  3,29779879 
14 113  -12,7952065 0,03269039  3,26009644 
15 118  -17,5748119 0,0064536  4,46439932 
16 118  -19,4286234 -0,02852978 4,43827608 
17 118  -18,304015  -0,01398659 4,43965845 
18 118  -18,6982096 -0,01830388 4,44644757 
19 122  -21,4734761 0,02970141  5,50031128 
20 122  -21,4176514 -0,01771962 5,53343274 
21 122  -21,5232696 -0,00261802 5,56983714 
22 120  -20,6573839 -0,02112109 5,06762943 
23 120  -20,6563397 0,0269679  5,01250669 
24 120  -20,3399086 0,00649575  4,98067186 
25 120  -21,7469271 -0,02825293 5,00083514 
26 120  -20,4221053 0,01441197  5,09121202 
27 120  -19,7530144 -0,00729619 4,90281236 
28 124  -16,300478  -0,00043995 6,00923223 
29 124  -15,5630177 -0,01585819 5,88567813 
30 124  -16,0749486 -0,00390058 6,15837259 
31 123  -17,3323753 -0,01721181 5,68486851 
32 123  -18,0073903 -0,0017073  5,47388642 
33 121  -19,2877579 0,00254208  5,2757023 
34 117  -22,5673032 0,00259609  4,17311895 
35 117  -22,9561734 0,00254775  4,18112153 
36 117  -24,0716718 -0,0261837  4,09802273 
37 117  -23,6513094 -0,0092006  4,06512167 
38 117  -22,520769  0,01573323  4,24215281 
39 117  -23,0479753 0,00241269  4,01489331 
40 119  -21,7801648 -0,00683681 4,84147194 
41 119  -20,4920686 0,00614607  4,77907831 
42 119  -21,0788215 0,01844674  4,80862272 
43 119  -21,6135672 -0,00911372 4,87718887 
44 119  -19,5790844 0,01158676  4,77583947 
45 119  -21,4668983 0,00624919  4,73698747 
46 123  -17,0172912 0,01034978  5,87177805 
47 123  -16,6074811 0,00771253  5,6936044 
48 123  -16,8622381 0,01420951  5,82428299 
49 123  -18,8803799 -0,01945756 5,83132058   47
50 123  -17,62329  -0,00401125 5,6505121 
51 114  -25,4956908 -0,00989457 3,45123657 
52 114  -26,0787774 -0,00715868 3,53377934 
53 114  -26,6515342 0,01082684  3,5719939 
54 114  -24,9109608 0,00081884  3,53062598 
55 114  -25,4141102 -0,00866576 3,56924128 
56 114  -24,2968487 -0,00217773 3,43856355 
57 118  -22,7360145 0,02724459  4,34332965 
58 118  -21,9531438 0,01697715  4,6198231 
59 118  -21,4092989 0,00271601  4,50789754 
60 118  -23,4212897 0,00619491  4,47354129 
61 120  -20,1530206 0,02222515  4,85958297 
62 120  -19,8121452 0,00662173  4,77976668 
63 120  -17,9456307 0,02554472  4,95718085 
64 120  -20,5451895 0,02323942  5,00072721 
65 120  -20,6149276 -0,01484706 4,98549726 
66 115  -23,934954  -0,01568495 3,81396289 
67 115  -25,3927538 0,00673402  3,75868059 
68 115  -24,7002267 0,02647683  3,74258356 
69 115  -26,2067514 0,03851273  3,82575063 
70 115  -25,4933253 0,03677056  3,60749026 
71 115  -25,5572636 -0,02500791 3,79042279 
72 115  -25,4628802 0,00757989  3,86734831 
73 115  -24,5785013 0,02263971  3,81564915 
74 121  -18,1339527 0,00604041  5,26177179 
75 121  -18,2714345 -0,02564336 5,22320625 
76 121  -18,6176534 0,01333457  5,43261724 
77 121  -19,7497304 -0,0188169  5,2332398 
78 121  -18,916194  -0,01024908 5,35039412 
79 121  -18,276196  0,02313249  5,41575538 
80 121  -18,5930698 0,00434133  5,27324078 
81 121  -20,0093993 0,0274309  5,33139511 
82 121  -21,3273473 0,00034286  5,28104655 
83 121  -19,0949997 -0,00272645 5,17695813 
84 120  -19,0463161 0,00525836  4,88121587 
85 120  -20,1141988 0,11419882  4,95432047 
86 120  -20,073488  0,073488  4,9706048 
87 120  -20,43922  0,43922  4,824312 
88 124  -16,2843947 0,28439472  5,88624211 
89 124  -16,9731787 0,97317874  5,61072851 
90 124  -16,8862916 0,8862916  5,64548336 
91 123  -18,1415954 1,14159541  5,29336183 
92 123  -18,4188107 1,41881067  5,18247573 
93 121  -20,6871801 1,68718008  4,57512797 
94 117  -25,232914  2,23291401  3,35683439 
95 117  -25,0108169 2,01081689  3,44567324 
96 117  -25,2622101 2,26221007  3,34511597 
97 117  -25,486831  2,486831  3,2552676 
98 117  -25,7551878 2,7551878  3,14792488 
99 117  -25,9845647 2,98456471  3,05617411 
100 119  -24,1534821 3,15348205  3,48860718 
101 119  -24,4462814 3,44628137  3,37148745 
102 119  -24,022663  3,02266297  3,54093481 
103 119  -24,5477879 3,54778792  3,33088483 
104 119  -25,1506424 4,1506424  3,08974304 
105 119  -25,0355432 4,03554318  3,13578273   48
106 123  -21,1781518 4,17815183  4,07873927 
107 123  -21,8304117 4,83041171  3,81783532 
108 123  -21,6562272 4,6562272  3,88750912 
109 123  -21,8378427 4,83784265  3,81486294 
110 123  -21,9804395 4,98043955  3,75782418 
111 114  -31,1742883 5,17428832  1,43028467 
112 114  -31,3772743 5,37727435  1,34909026 
113 114  -31,72662  5,72662003  1,20935199 
114 114  -31,8777139 5,87771394  1,14891442 
115 114  -31,7228447 5,7228447  1,21086212 
116 114  -31,8672343 5,86723427  1,15310629 
117 118  -28,6282518 6,62825178  1,84869929 
118 118  -28,7792037 6,77920365  1,78831854 
119 118  -29,044107  7,04410699  1,68235721 
120 118  -29,0449413 7,04494125  1,6820235 
121 120  -27,3516107 7,3516107  2,05935572 
122 120  -27,3792149 7,37921492  2,04831403 
123 120  -27,442722  7,44272199  2,0229112 
124 120  -27,8499227 7,84992268  1,86003093 
125 120  -28,1239448 8,12394479  1,75042208 
126 115  -33,2646224 8,26462235  0,44415106 
127 115  -33,0871559 8,08715594  0,51513762 
128 115  -33,3321287 8,33212874  0,4171485 
129 115  -33,8440653 8,84406534  0,21237386 
130 115  -33,8723623 8,87236229  0,20105509 
131 115  -34,0806617 9,08066167  0,11773533 
132 115  -34,6764254 9,6764254  -0,12057016
133 115  -34,7778179 9,77781785  -0,16112714
134 121  -28,2711689 9,27116887  1,54153245 
135 121  -28,5177403 9,5177403  1,44290388 
136 121  -29,0604814 10,0604814  1,22580744 
137 121  -29,2179133 10,2179133  1,16283468 
138 121  -29,4524543 10,4524543  1,06901826 
139 121  -29,6680283 10,6680283  0,98278866 
140 121  -29,8959591 10,8959591  0,89161638 
141 121  -30,0898236 11,0898236  0,81407057 
142 121  -30,7858072 11,7858072  0,53567714 
143 121  -30,290302  11,290302  0,73387918 
144 120  -32,0725195 12,0725195  0,17099221 
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7.2.3 Table IV. 
 
Data panel Regional Cartel 
OBS P  DW  XD  RD 
1 100  0  0 
2 102  -0,01682607  -2  0,5 
3 102,5  -0,00930684  -2,5  0,625 
4 103  0,02009625  -3  0,75 
5 103,2  -0,01253862  -3,2  0,8 
6 104  -0,00283246  -4  1 
7 108  -0,01038944  -8  2 
8 109  0,02577056  -9  2,25 
9 110  -0,00085503  -10  2,5 
10 113  -0,00844539  -13  3,25 
11 114  0,00992539  -14  3,5 
12 116  0,0019424  -16  4 
13 116  -0,01022337  -16  4 
14 116,5  0,00973264  -16,5  4,125 
15 116  -0,0009332  -16  4 
16 117  -0,01053428  -17  4,25 
17 118  0,02800533  -18  4,5 
18 119  -0,00628335  -19  4,75 
19 120  -0,0102015  -20  5 
20 121  -0,01734816  -21  5,25 
21 125  -0,00469341  -25  6,25 
22 122  0,01139554  -22  5,5 
23 120  0,01027972  -20  5 
24 120  -0,00579054  -20  5 
25 118,459326  -0,02092406  -21,5406744 4,6148314 
26 121,541002  -0,0501014  -18,4589983 5,38525042 
27 120,97794  -0,0152489  -19,0220602 5,24448494 
28 124,369654  -0,00325767  -15,6303464 6,0924134 
29 124,953926  -0,03498603  -15,0460737 6,23848157 
30 123,385012  -0,00846926  -16,6149884 5,84625291 
31 123,473099  -0,01059164  -16,526901  5,86827475 
32 122,449878  -0,00507106  -17,5501218 5,61246954 
33 120,220953  -0,00609581  -19,7790472 5,0552382 
34 117,422795  -0,02337778  -22,5772054 4,35569865 
35 118,304122  -0,00454592  -21,6958783 4,57603043 
36 116,786215  0,00164466  -23,2137846 4,19655385 
37 117,352061  0,02755781  -22,6479388 4,33801529 
38 117,584861  -0,01078441  -22,4151391 4,39621522 
39 115,99645  0,01665995  -24,0035501 3,99911247 
40 117,219173  0,02246241  -22,7808266 4,30479336 
41 118,589896  0,01237914  -21,4101044 4,64747389 
42 118,31506  0,06113758  -21,6849401 4,57876498 
43 118,241007  0,06828408  -21,7589926 4,56025184 
44 119,911417  -0,0315848  -20,0885831 4,97785421 
45 119,964714  0,02488329  -20,0352862 4,99117845 
46 122,865027  -0,0061469  -17,1349729 5,71625678 
47 123,18301  -0,00565627  -16,8169902 5,79575245 
48 124,594928  -0,00909314  -15,4050722 6,14873195 
49 122,568501  -0,00627407  -17,4314995 5,64212513   50
50 124,992526  -0,02577856  -15,0074737 6,24813158 
51 113,841782  -0,00659045  -26,158218  3,46044549 
52 113,085405  -0,00508252  -26,9145945 3,27135137 
53 113,869837  0,00794121  -26,1301634 3,46745916 
54 113,823004  -0,00331258  -26,1769962 3,45575094 
55 115,004573  0,03482281  -24,9954271 3,75114323 
56 113,64321  -0,01457214  -26,3567901 3,41080247 
57 117,657958  -0,0202781  -22,3420421 4,41448949 
58 118,988553  0,01327016  -21,0114469 4,74713826 
59 116,777849  -0,00135514  -23,2221507 4,19446234 
60 117,94609  -0,02560066  -22,0539101 4,48652249 
61 118,987542  0,00043969  -21,0124577 4,74688557 
62 119,227018  -0,00023083  -20,7729824 4,80675441 
63 121,677929  0,0102655  -18,3220711 5,41948221 
64 120,515946  0,00822058  -19,4840543 5,12898642 
65 118,690479  -0,01144008  -21,3095211 4,67261973 
66 115,096366  -0,00197283  -24,9036344 3,77409139 
67 115,245588  -0,01592631  -24,7544119 3,81139703 
68 115,124348  0,0232382  -24,8756518 3,78108705 
69 114,89289  -0,00407425  -25,1071103 3,72322243 
70 115,477989  -0,00735614  -24,5220108 3,86949729 
71 115,377131  -0,00075371  -24,6228694 3,84428265 
72 116,460829  0,01133061  -23,5391711 4,11520724 
73 116,411954  -0,01236393  -23,5880457 4,10298857 
74 121,752642  0,01505783  -18,2473577 5,43816058 
75 120,423282  -0,03147075  -19,5767183 5,10582043 
76 119,303251  0,0007691  -20,696749  4,82581275 
77 121,961378  -0,02323088  -18,0386222 5,49034444 
78 120,313619  -0,01287671  -19,6863809 5,07840477 
79 120,046854  0,03727381  -19,9531455 5,01171362 
80 119,705764  -0,00904039  -20,2942363 4,92644092 
81 122,292443  0,00153886  -17,7075574 5,57311065 
82 121,621456  0,00164858  -18,3785441 5,40536399 
83 119,940067  0,00073591  -20,0599326 4,98501684 
84 118,642992  -0,0486076  -21,3570085 4,66074788 
85 120,315763  -0,00923503  -19,6842375 5,07894063 
86 120,444357  0,03762549  -13,4599614 5,09603905 
87 119,078528  -0,13429963  -15,0636134 4,82335196 
88 123,774143  -0,80941573  -8,28419839 6,26730204 
89 125,008168  -0,70768782  -6,78169321 6,53511724 
90 124,101835  -0,90469916  -7,7629155  6,38733838 
91 122,483652  -1,19072391  -9,58052821 6,09720262 
92 123,867158  -1,31932702  -7,65336804 6,49452022 
93 121,733573  -1,81289204  -9,93346292 6,15855009 
94 117,827601  -1,71279327  -15,1113251 5,14201761 
95 118,786927  -1,83235214  -13,7446431 5,42967253 
96 119,258815  -2,21611958  -12,7474212 5,70115153 
97 118,185757  -2,34596281  -14,012553  5,4848244 
98 117,484224  -2,66844364  -14,6020651 5,43843347 
99 118,811093  -2,74345331  -12,8021254 5,80015465 
100 119,64586  -3,19756756  -11,2628139 6,19049213 
101 119,087007  -3,3350277  -11,8518639 6,1057627 
102 119,016443  -3,20800837  -12,070616  6,03731406 
103 119,495184  -3,17355854  -11,4827023 6,14321941 
104 118,569707  -3,51637266  -12,3430078 6,04897591 
105 118,351841  -3,99424396  -12,1483631 6,18565776   51
106 121,72832  -4,07196795  -7,68121647 7,0608671 
107 121,102088  -4,22600506  -8,34128102 6,96592393 
108 121,687264  -4,56572675  -7,24083001 7,24810671 
109 123,777604  -4,70309622  -4,38601838 7,82563953 
110 123,571721  -4,81832115  -4,53844182 7,82025866 
111 114,692784  -5,0587242  -15,8406567 5,69668567 
112 114,266632  -5,27496333  -16,1784144 5,67664346 
113 114,297675  -5,67555625  -15,737466  5,84464129 
114 113,818911  -5,91523561  -16,1201797 5,82082207 
115 114,33855  -5,93524785  -15,4246367 5,95873673 
116 114,664652  -6,25290364  -14,6830482 6,16732456 
117 117,689992  -6,46115656  -10,541854  7,00696059 
118 116,521597  -6,72534113  -11,7965828 6,82053569 
119 118,338411  -6,74861364  -9,41145267 7,28404809 
120 116,599836  -7,2892216  -11,1309915 7,06564767 
121 119,963471  -6,94282245  -7,10466556 7,76799667 
122 121,070897  -7,36190593  -5,24592842 8,21248654 
123 120,707173  -7,87738469  -5,20329018 8,32774717 
124 120,30658  -7,67090988  -5,93053658 8,14500886 
125 119,97504  -8,07129159  -5,96115701 8,22227652 
126 116,024548  -8,25059099  -10,9174961 7,30637349 
127 115,568834  -8,2739052  -11,4866101 7,20177068 
128 112,879  -8,605758  -14,6515414 6,66205331 
129 115,984264  -8,56555553  -10,654901  7,42228826 
130 114,072309  -9,0107502  -12,6952487 7,12237722 
131 113,479436  -8,89628777  -13,5804457 6,92837406 
132 113,804954  -9,31758564  -12,7359743 7,17827273 
133 113,005726  -9,48711936  -13,605437  7,0462792 
134 120,073838  -9,41595417  -4,48805646 8,78484116 
135 119,872589  -10,0763207  -4,08931406 8,99867544 
136 121,924119  -10,5630167  -0,93562809 9,70623653 
137 121,63805  -10,5770779  -1,2934567  9,64034373 
138 121,045031  -10,452664  -2,18879525 9,44232343 
139 120,968252  -10,7113496  -2,02992321 9,52660276 
140 119,131428  -10,8974197  -4,23172387 9,14182489 
141 121,269058  -11,0230625  -1,32716161 9,7264896 
142 121,064906  -11,0752456  -1,54037646 9,69632476 
143 121,282412  -11,5556699  -0,77719492 9,94287089 
144 121,264802  -11,6914565  -0,66430108 9,99278306 
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7.2.4 Table V. 
Data panel Competetive benchmark 
OBS P  RD  DW  XD 
1 99,7090699  -0,29662295  -0,23729836 -0,29093012
2 99,2967765  0,06098265  0,04878612 -0,70322352
3 98,1685045  0,29656153  0,23724922 -1,83149552
4 97,777261  -1,37434505  -1,09947604 -2,22273903
5 100,382873  0,04464351  0,03571481 0,38287334
6 100,126016  -0,32970266  -0,26376213 0,1260155
7 100,315456  1,96347149  1,57077719 0,31545575
8 99,6904137  -0,19101724  -0,15281379 -0,30958634
9 101,252452  0,15999514  0,12799611 1,2524523
10 98,8642171  -1,45712891  -1,16570313 -1,13578287
11 99,1376354  -0,15869339  -0,12695471 -0,86236459
12 100,043127  0,80240563  0,64192451 0,04312677
13 99,4430241  -0,75891789  -0,60713432 -0,55697592
14 96,8726665  -0,47880189  -0,38304151 -3,12733348
15 103,027543  -1,03758342  -0,83006674 3,02754331
16 98,7906763  0,21313742  0,17050993 -1,20932369
17 99,1759911  1,08494595  0,86795676 -0,82400892
18 99,0921893  -0,06712423  -0,05369938 -0,90781066
19 101,457533  -0,70551777  -0,56441421 1,45753337
20 100,122868  1,12137423  0,89709939 0,12286775
21 101,761656  0,66821412  0,5345713 1,76165608
22 95,8533077  -0,99711307  -0,79769046 -4,14669228
23 96,0331129  -0,38377298  -0,30701838 -3,96688708
24 100,278097  0,0739968  0,05919744 0,27809658
25 99,1020465  -1,18641265  -0,94913012 -0,89795348
26 98,3020655  -0,26190017  -0,20952014 -1,69793453
27 101,026909  1,31417316  1,05133853 1,02690881
28 100,9553  0,29909106  0,23927285 0,95530002
29 100,961176  0,32499995  0,25999996 0,96117577
30 97,9173422  -0,26215394  -0,20972315 -2,0826578
31 98,1311486  -0,7716878  -0,61735024 -1,86885139
32 102,696975  0,31499862  0,25199889 2,69697464
33 101,202789  -0,15757049  -0,1260564 1,20278901
34 99,7854029  -0,31509362  -0,25207489 -0,21459706
35 96,099769  -0,28382832  -0,22706265 -3,90023101
36 98,7311536  0,46014477  0,36811581 -1,26884643
37 100,673848  -0,4392679  -0,35141432 0,673848
38 101,22715  -1,16510434  -0,93208347 1,22715047
39 98,4997713  -0,9096893  -0,72775144 -1,50022871
40 97,1869468  0,92306483  0,73845186 -2,81305318
41 100,855957  0,24434914  0,19547931 0,85595691
42 101,251506  0,81111736  0,64889389 1,25150591  53
43 96,7605814  -0,44108274  -0,35286619 -3,23941862
44 101,304176  0,2107027  0,16856216 1,30417572
45 99,0082451  1,1172976  0,89383808 -0,99175489
46 100,951613  1,23012207  0,98409766 0,95161317
47 100,326516  -0,15734985  -0,12587988 0,32651632
48 100,932493  1,53038665  1,22430932 0,93249306
49 99,1534035  2,21133253  1,76906602 -0,84659652
50 103,202358  -0,7697201  -0,61577608 3,20235787
51 101,105623  0,79622668  0,63698134 1,10562342
52 102,604857  0,9212638  0,73701104 2,6048574
53 101,945973  0,70241444  0,56193155 1,9459734
54 98,4265253  0,35260063  0,28208051 -1,57347471
55 97,7991618  -0,33450149  -0,26760119 -2,20083823
56 102,572744  1,39584282  1,11667426 2,57274406
57 99,9695105  0,61398264  0,49118611 -0,03048953
58 101,717495  -0,90902241  -0,72721793 1,71749512
59 99,9195787  1,09775449  0,87820359 -0,08042127
60 100,788681  -1,52282331  -1,21825865 0,78868094
61 103,544363  0,27554413  0,2204353 3,5443627
62 99,1748565  0,0107663  0,00861304 -0,82514351
63 101,827366  -0,02457669  -0,01966135 1,82736633
64 100,905154  -0,59111453  -0,47289162 0,90515383
65 102,279467  -0,02523433  -0,02018746 2,27946698
66 100,298786  0,75864187  0,60691349 0,298786
67 100,860099  0,09229134  0,07383307 0,86009914
68 99,7424697  0,03679605  0,02943684 -0,25753026
69 100,243575  1,73465519  1,38772415 0,24357501
70 101,036802  0,0130759  0,01046072 1,03680185
71 99,1977929  -0,76820244  -0,61456195 -0,8022071
72 103,335193  0,15196021  0,12156817 3,3351933
73 100,75111  0,38125398  0,30500319 0,75111013
74 98,8974371  -1,56497508  -1,25198006 -1,10256289
75 99,7062285  0,37361911  0,29889529 -0,29377153
76 99,3574553  1,16282107  0,93025686 -0,64254467
77 97,7074279  0,44421728  0,35537383 -2,29257213
78 99,2090076  0,25485378  0,20388303 -0,79099244
79 98,7593182  0,89516574  0,71613259 -1,24068184
80 100,725611  -0,19489618  -0,15591694 0,72561127
81 97,3640218  -0,4488311  -0,35906488 -2,63597817
82 95,8866734  0,25128565  0,20102852 -4,11332659
83 100,027778  0,89114269  0,71291415 0,0277776
84 100,940793  -1,96906729  -1,57525383 0,94079322
85 104,062867  0,79059903  0,63247923 4,06286747
86 98,6897988  -1,02878426  -0,82302741 -1,31020115
87 98,2280655  0,09649689  0,07719751 -1,77193449
88 99,1314908  -0,25409519  -0,20327615 -0,86850919
89 101,500548  -0,63729977  -0,50983982 1,50054768  54
90 100,356293  -0,55587773  -0,44470218 0,35629283
91 98,9348533  0,82246896  0,65797517 -1,06514672
92 99,0051295  0,42917708  0,34334166 -0,99487045
93 99,0162992  0,94221766  0,75377413 -0,98370083
94 96,4204616  -0,68976171  -0,55180937 -3,57953837
95 102,113191  1,44196101  1,15356881 2,11319106
96 104,058829  0,52949838  0,4235987 4,05882857
97 101,803028  0,11515586  0,09212469 1,8030284
98 97,1472223  -0,24943359  -0,19954687 -2,8527777
99 97,8595292  -0,03079236  -0,02463389 -2,1404708
100 101,160902  0,29770849  0,23816679 1,16090209
101 97,2593534  0,28750764  0,23000611 -2,74064656
102 99,3403558  -1,08397853  -0,86718282 -0,65964424
103 100,4579  -0,28064196  -0,22451357 0,45789976
104 98,3463973  0,29299303  0,23439442 -1,65360274
105 102,437395  1,2560245  1,0048196 2,43739492
106 104,285853  0,46216873  0,36973499 4,28585336
107 100,783443  0,04404181  0,03523345 0,78344296
108 100,555191  1,58243556  1,26594845 0,55519118
109 103,589467  1,15998648  0,92798919 3,58946662
110 100,966549  -0,75889291  -0,60711433 0,96654942
111 99,9441741  -1,97989936  -1,58391949 -0,05582587
112 98,1164301  -1,67561288 -1,3404903 -1,88356993
113 101,974703  0,02184275  0,0174742 1,97470328
114 100,875097  0,21360909  0,17088727 0,87509692
115 101,614387  0,44949678  0,35959743 1,61438731
116 95,7207369  -0,50640107  -0,40512085 -4,27926312
117 99,9267076  1,05784113  0,8462729 -0,07329244
118 103,309529  -0,88516944  -0,70813555 3,30952939
119 100,260302  -1,22667862  -0,98134289 0,26030217
120 100,602146 -1,3164868  -1,05318944 0,60214573
121 96,3449044  0,63420807  0,50736646 -3,65509561
122 102,124135 -0,3915502  -0,31324016 2,12413494
123 99,0895848  1,14881118  0,91904894 -0,91041515
124 103,902593  0,52967702  0,42374162 3,90259273
125 100,742711  1,1816057  0,94528456 0,74271085
126 99,6528035  -0,70066558  -0,56053246 -0,34719646
127 99,9219928  -0,00507558  -0,00406047 -0,07800718
128 101,468992  0,85359038  0,68287231 1,46899209
129 99,3400682  0,98667797  0,78934238 -0,65993176
130 93,4597257  0,1586728  0,12693824 -6,54027433
131 97,8299421 -1,3009979  -1,04079832 -2,17005786
132 102,840459  0,20023854  0,16019083 2,84045867
133 96,4671501  -0,53563293  -0,42850634 -3,53284987
134 97,0537939  0,85301219  0,68240975 -2,94620615
135 100,636675  -1,17814505  -0,94251604 0,63667453
136 102,559444  -0,03114518  -0,02491614 2,55944369  55
137 99,5102371  -1,88783302  -1,51026642 -0,48976286
138 99,257388  -0,12063736  -0,09650989 -0,74261197
139 99,4825243  1,37057585  1,09646068 -0,51747568
140 100,290865  -0,15474869  -0,12379895 0,29086507
141 101,133586  0,19597334  0,15677867 1,13358635
142 99,4714523  1,31500063  1,05200051 -0,52854769
143 95,7816776  1,02605686  0,82084549 -4,21832238
144 98,4715218  1,07294206  0,85835365 -1,52847819
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a) Utilisation rate of capacities 
 
a)  Zero Stationarity 
 
Null Hypothesis: XD has a unit root   
Exogenous: None     
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=5) 
      t-Statistic    Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic   0.739052   0.8672 
Test critical values:  1% level    -2.669359   
 5%  level    -1.956406   
 10%  level    -1.608495   




        b)     Intercept Stationarity 
 
Null Hypothesis: XD has a unit root   
Exogenous: Constant     
Lag Length: 2 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=5) 
      t-Statistic    Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic  -2.031697   0.2721 
Test critical values:  1% level    -3.788030   
 5%  level    -3.012363   
 10%  level    -2.646119   
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.   
 
           c)    Trend Test 
 
Dependent Variable: XD     
Method: Least Squares     
Date: 06/16/10   Time: 15:51     
Sample: 1 24       
Included observations: 24     
Variable Coefficient  Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.785440  1.025910 -0.765604 0.4520
@TREND -1.040360  0.076431 -13.61169 0.0000
R-squared  0.893862      Mean dependent var  -12.74958
Adjusted R-squared  0.889038      S.D. dependent var  7.780965
E. of regression  2.591915      Akaike info criterion  4.822326
Sum squared resid  147.7965      Schwarz criterion  4.920498
Log likelihood  -55.86792      Hannan-Quinn criter.  4.848371
F-statistic  185.2780      Durbin-Watson stat  0.880537
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000       
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Cartel Phase 
       d)    Zero Stationarity 
Null Hypothesis: XD has a unit root   
Exogenous: None     
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=10) 
      t-Statistic    Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic  -0.434660   0.5219 
Test critical values:  1% level    -2.604073   
 5%  level    -1.946348   
 10%  level    -1.613293   
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.   
 
 
        e)    Intercept stationarity 
Null Hypothesis: XD has a unit root   
Exogenous: Constant     
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=10) 
      t-Statistic    Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic  -2.638817   0.0910 
Test critical values:  1% level    -3.544063   
 5%  level    -2.910860   
 10%  level    -2.593090   
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.   
 
 
        f)    Trend Test 
Dependent Variable: XD     
Method: Least Squares     
Date: 06/28/10   Time: 11:58     
Sample: 25 84       
Included observations: 60     
Variable Coefficient  Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -19.84566  1.266271 -15.67253 0.0000
@TREND -0.024413  0.022518 -1.084152 0.2828
R-squared  0.019863      Mean dependent var  -21.15177
Adjusted R-squared  0.002964      S.D. dependent var  3.025204
S.E. of regression  3.020717      Akaike info criterion  5.081631
Sum squared resid  529.2345      Schwarz criterion  5.151442
Log likelihood  -150.4489      Hannan-Quinn criter.  5.108938
F-statistic  1.175385      Durbin-Watson stat  0.445244








   59






Dependent Variable: DP     
Method: Least Squares     
Date: 06/25/10   Time: 16:53     
Sample (adjusted): 2 24     
Included observations: 23 after adjustments   
Variable Coefficient  Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.902038  0.973093 0.926980 0.3645
XD 0.002437  0.064142 0.037997 0.9700
R-squared  0.000069      Mean dependent var  0.869565
Adjusted R-squared  -0.047547      S.D. dependent var  2.180583
S.E. of regression  2.231821      Akaike info criterion  4.526454
Sum squared resid  104.6015      Schwarz criterion  4.625192
Log likelihood  -50.05422      Hannan-Quinn criter.  4.551286
F-statistic  0.001444      Durbin-Watson stat  2.337658





Dependent Variable: DP     
Method: Least Squares     
Date: 06/28/10   Time: 12:11     
Sample: 25 84       
Included observations: 60     
Variable Coefficient  Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 3.818344  1.717457 2.223254 0.0301
XD 0.180521  0.080392 2.245503 0.0286
R-squared  0.079983      Mean dependent var  0.000000
Adjusted R-squared  0.064120      S.D. dependent var  1.931014
S.E. of regression  1.868080      Akaike info criterion  4.120464
Sum squared resid  202.4038      Schwarz criterion  4.190276
Log likelihood  -121.6139      Hannan-Quinn criter.  4.147771
F-statistic  5.042284      Durbin-Watson stat  1.845153
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       i)    Zero Stationarity 
Null Hypothesis: RD has a unit root   
Exogenous: None     
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=5) 
      t-Statistic    Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic   0.787431   0.8762 
Test critical values:  1% level    -2.669359   
 5%  level    -1.956406   
 10%  level    -1.608495   
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.   
 
        
          j)     Intercept Stationarity 
Null Hypothesis: RD has a unit root   
Exogenous: Constant     
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=5) 
      t-Statistic    Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic  -1.317014   0.6037 
Test critical values:  1% level    -3.752946   
 5%  level    -2.998064   
 10%  level    -2.638752   
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.   
 
         
           k)     Trend Test 
Dependent Variable: RD     
Method: Least Squares     
Date: 06/25/10   Time: 18:09     
Sample: 1 24       
Included observations: 24     
Variable Coefficient  Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.069211  0.244629 0.282924 0.7799
@TREND 0.263950  0.018225 14.48276 0.0000
R-squared  0.905070      Mean dependent var  3.104634
Adjusted R-squared  0.900755      S.D. dependent var  1.961847
S.E. of regression  0.618043      Akaike info criterion  1.955139
Sum squared resid  8.403503      Schwarz criterion  2.053310
Log likelihood  -21.46166      Hannan-Quinn criter.  1.981183
F-statistic  209.7504      Durbin-Watson stat  0.872094
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Cartel Phase 
        l)     Zero Stationarity 
Null Hypothesis: RD has a unit root   
Exogenous: None     
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=10) 
      t-Statistic    Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic  -0.425261   0.5256 
Test critical values:  1% level    -2.604073   
 5%  level    -1.946348   
 10%  level    -1.613293   
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.   
 
          
         m)     Intercept stationary 
Null Hypothesis: RD has a unit root   
Exogenous: Constant     
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=10) 
      t-Statistic    Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic  -2.637367   0.0913 
Test critical values:  1% level    -3.544063   
 5%  level    -2.910860   
 10%  level    -2.593090   
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.   
 
 
        n)     Trend test 
Dependent Variable: RD     
Method: Least Squares     
Date: 06/28/10   Time: 12:23     
Sample: 25 84       
Included observations: 60     
Variable Coefficient  Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 5.052069  0.321142 15.73159 0.0000
@TREND -0.006066  0.005711 -1.062128 0.2926
R-squared  0.019079      Mean dependent var  4.727554
Adjusted R-squared  0.002167      S.D. dependent var  0.766922
S.E. of regression  0.766090      Akaike info criterion  2.337732
Sum squared resid  34.03989      Schwarz criterion  2.407544
Log likelihood  -68.13197      Hannan-Quinn criter.  2.365039
F-statistic  1.128115      Durbin-Watson stat  0.434817
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Dependent Variable: DW     
Method: Least Squares     
Date: 06/25/10   Time: 18:49     
Sample (adjusted): 2 24     
Included observations: 23 after adjustments   
Variable Coefficient  Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.000218  0.004657 0.046835 0.9631
RD -8.42E-05  0.001249 -0.067392 0.9469
R-squared  0.000216      Mean dependent var  -5.46E-05
Adjusted R-squared  -0.047393      S.D. dependent var  0.010803
S.E. of regression  0.011056      Akaike info criterion  -6.088672
Sum squared resid  0.002567      Schwarz criterion  -5.989933
Log likelihood  72.01973      Hannan-Quinn criter.  -6.063839
F-statistic  0.004542      Durbin-Watson stat  3.121374




Dependent Variable: DW     
Method: Least Squares     
Date: 06/28/10   Time: 13:12     
Sample: 25 84       
Included observations: 60     
Variable Coefficient  Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.006550  0.015696 -0.417292 0.6780
RD 0.001016  0.003278 0.309995 0.7577
R-squared  0.001654      Mean dependent var  -0.001746
Adjusted R-squared  -0.015559      S.D. dependent var  0.019162
S.E. of regression  0.019310      Akaike info criterion  -5.023581
Sum squared resid  0.021628      Schwarz criterion  -4.953769
Log likelihood  152.7074      Hannan-Quinn criter.  -4.996274
F-statistic  0.096097      Durbin-Watson stat  1.655053
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f) Variance of capacity growth rate changes  
Formation Phase 
q) 
Test for Equality of Variances Between Series     
Date: 06/16/10   Time: 16:48       
Sample: 1 24         
Included observations: 24       
Method df Value Probability  
F-test (22,  22) 8514.686 0.0000  
Siegel-Tukey   5.690018 0.0000  
Bartlett 1 164.8501 0.0000  
Levene (1,  44) 59.43456 0.0000  
Brown-Forsythe (1,  44) 41.91517 0.0000  
      
Category Statistics       
      Mean Abs. Mean Abs. Mean Tukey- 
Variable Count  Std.  Dev. Mean  Diff. Median Diff. Siegel Rank 
DW_COMP 23  0.996882 0.835274 0.810824 12.21739 
DW 23  0.010803 0.008666 0.008615 34.78261 
All 46  0.697097 0.421970 0.409720 23.50000 






Test for Equality of Variances Between Series     
Date: 06/28/10   Time: 13:15       
Sample: 25 84         
Included observations: 60       
Method df Value Probability  
F-test (59,  59) 2444.019 0.0000  
Siegel-Tukey   9.245477 0.0000  
Bartlett 1 375.3584 0.0000  
Levene (1,  118) 100.9756 0.0000  
Brown-Forsythe (1,  118) 100.9239 0.0000  
      
Category Statistics       
      Mean Abs. Mean Abs. Mean Tukey- 
Variable Count  Std.  Dev. Mean  Diff. Median Diff. Siegel Rank 
DW 60  0.019162 0.015547 0.015545 89.86667 
DW_COMP 60  0.947308 0.752063 0.752028 31.13333 
All 120  0.667287 0.383805 0.383786 60.50000 
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Type 2 Quota cartel 
 
Cartel phase II 
 
a) Utilization rate of capacities 
         a)     Zero Stationarity 
 
Null Hypothesis: XD has a unit root   
Exogenous: None     
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=10) 
      t-Statistic    Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic   0.504396   0.8216 
Test critical values:  1% level    -2.604073   
 5%  level    -1.946348   
 10%  level    -1.613293   
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.   
Quota Cartel 
  Cartel Phase II 
Sample 85-144 











































g)   65
 
b)  Intercept stationarity 
Null Hypothesis: XD has a unit root   
Exogenous: Constant     
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=10) 
      t-Statistic    Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic  -1.777090   0.3882 
Test critical values:  1% level    -3.544063   
 5%  level    -2.910860   
 10%  level    -2.593090   
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.   
 
c)  Trend Test 
Dependent Variable: XD     
Method: Least Squares     
Date: 06/28/10   Time: 16:27     
Sample: 85 144       
Included observations: 60     
Variable Coefficient  Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -1.278506  2.609386 -0.489964 0.6260
@TREND -0.226362  0.022727 -9.959995 0.0000
R-squared  0.631047      Mean dependent var  -26.97063
Adjusted R-squared  0.624685      S.D. dependent var  4.976491
S.E. of regression  3.048744      Akaike info criterion  5.100101
Sum squared resid  539.1006      Schwarz criterion  5.169913
Log likelihood  -151.0030      Hannan-Quinn criter.  5.127409
F-statistic  99.20149      Durbin-Watson stat  0.436572
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000       
 
 
b) Correlation between utilization rate of capacities and price changes 
d) 
 
Dependent Variable: DP     
Method: Least Squares     
Date: 06/28/10   Time: 18:13     
Sample: 85 144       
Included observations: 60     
Variable Coefficient  Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 1.890345  1.374000 1.375796 0.1742
XD 0.070089  0.050112 1.398637 0.1672
R-squared  0.032627      Mean dependent var  0.000000
Adjusted R-squared  0.015948      S.D. dependent var  1.931014
S.E. of regression  1.915554      Akaike info criterion  4.170656
Sum squared resid  212.8221      Schwarz criterion  4.240467
Log likelihood  -123.1197      Hannan-Quinn criter.  4.197963
F-statistic  1.956184      Durbin-Watson stat  1.845545
Prob(F-statistic) 0.167247         66
 
 
c) Rate of return differnace 
e)  Zero Stationarity 
Null Hypothesis: RD has a unit root   
Exogenous: None     
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=10) 
      t-Statistic    Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic  -1.701832   0.0839 
Test critical values:  1% level    -2.604073   
 5%  level    -1.946348   
 10%  level    -1.613293   
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.   
 
f)  Intercept Stationarity 
Null Hypothesis: RD has a unit root   
Exogenous: Constant     
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=10) 
      t-Statistic    Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic  -1.253924   0.6453 
Test critical values:  1% level    -3.544063   
 5%  level    -2.910860   
 10%  level    -2.593090   
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.   
 
g)  Trend Test 
Dependent Variable: RD     
Method: Least Squares     
Date: 06/28/10   Time: 17:53     
Sample: 85 144       
Included observations: 60     
Variable Coefficient  Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 12.15379  0.656914 18.50134 0.0000
@TREND -0.086185  0.005722 -15.06324 0.0000
R-squared  0.796421      Mean dependent var  2.371749
Adjusted R-squared  0.792911      S.D. dependent var  1.686601
S.E. of regression  0.767523      Akaike info criterion  2.341467
Sum squared resid  34.16727      Schwarz criterion  2.411279
Log likelihood  -68.24402      Hannan-Quinn criter.  2.368774
F-statistic  226.9012      Durbin-Watson stat  0.455622
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Dependent Variable: DW     
Method: Least Squares     
Date: 06/28/10   Time: 17:45     
Sample: 85 144       
Included observations: 60     
Variable Coefficient  Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 10.25311  0.346388 29.60005 0.0000
RD -1.833732  0.119356 -15.36352 0.0000
R-squared  0.802746      Mean dependent var  5.903961
Adjusted R-squared  0.799345      S.D. dependent var  3.451906
S.E. of regression  1.546264      Akaike info criterion  3.742325
Sum squared resid  138.6740      Schwarz criterion  3.812136
Log likelihood  -110.2698      Hannan-Quinn criter.  3.769632
F-statistic  236.0376      Durbin-Watson stat  0.327736












Test for Equality of Variances Between Series     
Date: 06/28/10   Time: 18:27       
Sample: 85 144         
Included observations: 60       
Method df Value Probability  
F-test (59,  59) 2.046913 0.0067  
Siegel-Tukey   0.543234 0.5870  
Bartlett 1 7.349922 0.0067  
Levene (1,  118) 13.01507 0.0005  
Brown-Forsythe (1,  118) 12.92880 0.0005  
      
Category Statistics       
      Mean Abs. Mean Abs. Mean Tukey- 
Variable Count  Std.  Dev. Mean  Diff. Median Diff. Siegel Rank 
DW_COMP 60  2.412733 1.885511 1.882839 62.23333 
DW 60  3.451906 2.953015 2.950915 58.76667 
All 120  4.063695 2.419263 2.416877 60.50000 
Bartlett weighted standard deviation:  2.977998     
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Cartel Phase I 
Sample 25-84 
Cartel Phase II 
Sample 85-144 
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Type 3 Regional cartel 
 
a) Utilization rate of capacities 
 
Formation phase 
a)  Zero Stationarity 
Null Hypothesis: XD has a unit root   
Exogenous: None     
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=5) 
      t-Statistic    Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic   1.334577   0.9493 
Test critical values:  1% level    -2.669359   
 5%  level    -1.956406   
 10%  level    -1.608495   
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.   
 
b)  Intercept Stationarity 
Null Hypothesis: XD has a unit root   
Exogenous: Constant     
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=5) 
      t-Statistic    Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic  -1.756819   0.3911 
Test critical values:  1% level    -3.752946   
 5%  level    -2.998064   
 10%  level    -2.638752   
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.   
 
c)  Trend Test 
Dependent Variable: XD     
Method: Least Squares     
Date: 06/28/10   Time: 19:43     
Sample: 1 24       
Included observations: 24     
Variable Coefficient  Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -1.478333  0.839237 -1.761520 0.0920
@TREND -1.013478  0.062524 -16.20940 0.0000
R-squared  0.922738      Mean dependent var  -13.13333
Adjusted R-squared  0.919226      S.D. dependent var  7.460369
S.E. of regression  2.120296      Akaike info criterion  4.420644
Sum squared resid  98.90442      Schwarz criterion  4.518815
Log likelihood  -51.04773      Hannan-Quinn criter.  4.446689
F-statistic  262.7445      Durbin-Watson stat  0.553717
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000       
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Cartel Phase I 
 
d)  Zero Stationarity 
Null Hypothesis: XD has a unit root   
Exogenous: None     
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=10) 
      t-Statistic    Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic  -0.333236   0.5611 
Test critical values:  1% level    -2.604073   
 5%  level    -1.946348   
 10%  level    -1.613293   
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.   
 
 
e)  Intercept Stationarity 
Null Hypothesis: XD has a unit root   
Exogenous: Constant     
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=10) 
      t-Statistic    Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic  -2.959287   0.0447 
Test critical values:  1% level    -3.544063   
 5%  level    -2.910860   
 10%  level    -2.593090   
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.   
 
 
f)  Trend Test 
Dependent Variable: XD     
Method: Least Squares     
Date: 06/29/10   Time: 11:32     
Sample: 25 84       
Included observations: 60     
Variable Coefficient  Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -19.23350  1.307570 -14.70934 0.0000
@TREND -0.033782  0.023253 -1.452808 0.1517
R-squared  0.035113      Mean dependent var  -21.04082
Adjusted R-squared  0.018477      S.D. dependent var  3.148461
S.E. of regression  3.119239      Akaike info criterion  5.145820
Sum squared resid  564.3198      Schwarz criterion  5.215632
Log likelihood  -152.3746      Hannan-Quinn criter.  5.173127
F-statistic  2.110652      Durbin-Watson stat  0.537318
Prob(F-statistic) 0.151666       
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Cartel Phase II 
 
g)  Zero Stationarity 
 
Null Hypothesis: XD has a unit root   
Exogenous: None     
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=10) 
      t-Statistic    Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic  -1.978853   0.0465 
Test critical values:  1% level    -2.604073   
 5%  level    -1.946348   
 10%  level    -1.613293   
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.   
 
 
h)  Intercept Stationarity 
Null Hypothesis: XD has a unit root   
Exogenous: Constant     
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=10) 
      t-Statistic    Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic  -2.641460   0.0905 
Test critical values:  1% level    -3.544063   
 5%  level    -2.910860   
 10%  level    -2.593090   
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.   
 
 
i)  Trend Test 
Dependent Variable: XD     
Method: Least Squares     
Date: 06/28/10   Time: 18:40     
Sample: 85 144       
Included observations: 60     
Variable Coefficient  Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -26.94476  3.494567 -7.710471 0.0000
@TREND 0.152997  0.030437 5.026701 0.0000
R-squared  0.303452      Mean dependent var  -9.579595
Adjusted R-squared  0.291442      S.D. dependent var  4.850519
S.E. of regression  4.082967      Akaike info criterion  5.684290
Sum squared resid  966.8960      Schwarz criterion  5.754102
Log likelihood  -168.5287      Hannan-Quinn criter.  5.711597
F-statistic  25.26772      Durbin-Watson stat  0.526424
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Dependent Variable: DP     
Method: Least Squares     
Date: 07/02/10   Time: 15:06     
Sample (adjusted): 2 24     
Included observations: 23 after adjustments   
Variable Coefficient  Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 1.346009  0.734960 1.831404 0.0813
XD 0.034766  0.047878 0.726131 0.4758
R-squared  0.024493      Mean dependent var  0.869565
Adjusted R-squared  -0.021960      S.D. dependent var  1.570881
S.E. of regression  1.588036      Akaike info criterion  3.845814
Sum squared resid  52.95901      Schwarz criterion  3.944553
Log likelihood  -42.22686      Hannan-Quinn criter.  3.870647
F-statistic  0.527266      Durbin-Watson stat  1.980955
Prob(F-statistic) 0.475775       
 
 
Cartel Phase I 
k) 
Dependent Variable: DP     
Method: Least Squares     
Date: 07/02/10   Time: 15:14     
Sample: 25 84       
Included observations: 60     
Variable Coefficient  Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 5.455274  1.883061 2.897025 0.0053
XD 0.260346  0.088526 2.940887 0.0047
R-squared  0.129767      Mean dependent var  -0.022617
Adjusted R-squared  0.114763      S.D. dependent var  2.275448
S.E. of regression  2.140902      Akaike info criterion  4.393096
Sum squared resid  265.8407      Schwarz criterion  4.462908
Log likelihood  -129.7929      Hannan-Quinn criter.  4.420403
F-statistic  8.648815      Durbin-Watson stat  2.002605
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Dependent Variable: DP     
Method: Least Squares     
Date: 06/29/10   Time: 11:55     
Sample: 85 144       
Included observations: 60     
Variable Coefficient  Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 246.1945  1.371643 179.4887 0.0000
XD 0.859584  0.127960 6.717615 0.0000
R-squared  0.437583      Mean dependent var  237.9600
Adjusted R-squared  0.427886      S.D. dependent var  6.302988
S.E. of regression  4.767467      Akaike info criterion  5.994272
Sum squared resid  1318.267      Schwarz criterion  6.064084
Log likelihood  -177.8282      Hannan-Quinn criter.  6.021580
F-statistic  45.12635      Durbin-Watson stat  0.194141
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000       
 
 




j)  Zero Stationarity 
Null Hypothesis: RD has a unit root   
Exogenous: None     
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=5) 
      t-Statistic    Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic   1.334577   0.9493 
Test critical values:  1% level    -2.669359   
 5%  level    -1.956406   
 10%  level    -1.608495   
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.   
 
k)  Intercept Stationarity 
Null Hypothesis: RD has a unit root   
Exogenous: Constant     
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=5) 
      t-Statistic    Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic  -1.756819   0.3911 
Test critical values:  1% level    -3.752946   
 5%  level    -2.998064   
 10%  level    -2.638752   
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.   
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Cartel Phase I 
 
l)  Zero Stationarity  
Null Hypothesis: RD has a unit root   
Exogenous: None     
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=10) 
      t-Statistic    Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic  -0.529072   0.4835 
Test critical values:  1% level    -2.604073   
 5%  level    -1.946348   
 10%  level    -1.613293   
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.   
 
 
m) Intercept Stationary 
Null Hypothesis: RD has a unit root   
Exogenous: Constant     
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=10) 
      t-Statistic    Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic  -2.959287   0.0447 
Test critical values:  1% level    -3.544063   
 5%  level    -2.910860   
 10%  level    -2.593090   
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.   
 
 
n)   Trend Test 
Dependent Variable: RD     
Method: Least Squares     
Date: 06/29/10   Time: 11:36     
Sample: 25 84       
Included observations: 60     
Variable Coefficient  Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 5.191624  0.326893 15.88174 0.0000
@TREND -0.008445  0.005813 -1.452808 0.1517
R-squared  0.035113      Mean dependent var  4.739794
Adjusted R-squared  0.018477      S.D. dependent var  0.787115
S.E. of regression  0.779810      Akaike info criterion  2.373232
Sum squared resid  35.26999      Schwarz criterion  2.443043
Log likelihood  -69.19695      Hannan-Quinn criter.  2.400539
F-statistic  2.110652      Durbin-Watson stat  0.537318
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Cartel Phase I 
I 
o)  Zero Stationarity 
 
Null Hypothesis: RD has a unit root   
Exogenous: None     
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=10) 
      t-Statistic    Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic   0.993715   0.9137 
Test critical values:  1% level    -2.604073   
 5%  level    -1.946348   
 10%  level    -1.613293   
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.   
 
p)  Intercept Stationarity 
Null Hypothesis: RD has a unit root   
Exogenous: Constant     
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=10) 
      t-Statistic    Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic  -1.230323   0.6558 
Test critical values:  1% level    -3.544063   
 5%  level    -2.910860   
 10%  level    -2.593090   
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.   
 
 
q)  Trend Test 
Dependent Variable: RD     
Method: Least Squares     
Date: 06/29/10   Time: 11:59     
Sample: 85 144       
Included observations: 60     
Variable Coefficient  Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.745427  0.661986 -1.126045 0.2648
@TREND 0.068983  0.005766 11.96435 0.0000
R-squared  0.711652      Mean dependent var  7.084192
Adjusted R-squared  0.706680      S.D. dependent var  1.428107
S.E. of regression  0.773449      Akaike info criterion  2.356850
Sum squared resid  34.69692      Schwarz criterion  2.426662
Log likelihood  -68.70551      Hannan-Quinn criter.  2.384157
F-statistic  143.1457      Durbin-Watson stat  0.502034
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000       
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Dependent Variable: DW     
Method: Least Squares     
Date: 06/28/10   Time: 19:55     
Sample (adjusted): 2 24     
Included observations: 23 after adjustments   
Variable Coefficient  Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.002091  0.006140 -0.340500 0.7369
RD 0.000483  0.001600 0.301654 0.7659
R-squared  0.004314      Mean dependent var  -0.000437
Adjusted R-squared  -0.043099      S.D. dependent var  0.012989
S.E. of regression  0.013266      Akaike info criterion  -5.724260
Sum squared resid  0.003696      Schwarz criterion  -5.625521
Log likelihood  67.82899      Hannan-Quinn criter.  -5.699427
F-statistic  0.090995      Durbin-Watson stat  2.374623
Prob(F-statistic) 0.765883       
 
Cartel Phase I 
v) 
 
Dependent Variable: DW     
Method: Least Squares     
Date: 06/29/10   Time: 11:46     
Sample: 25 84       
Included observations: 60     
Variable Coefficient  Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.026064  0.016936 1.538975 0.1292
RD -0.005965  0.003526 -1.691915 0.0960
R-squared  0.047033      Mean dependent var  -0.002209
Adjusted R-squared  0.030603      S.D. dependent var  0.021649
S.E. of regression  0.021316      Akaike info criterion  -4.825988
Sum squared resid  0.026353      Schwarz criterion  -4.756176
Log likelihood  146.7796      Hannan-Quinn criter.  -4.798681
F-statistic  2.862578      Durbin-Watson stat  1.798967
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Dependent Variable: DW     
Method: Least Squares     
Date: 06/29/10   Time: 12:04     
Sample: 85 144       
Included observations: 60     
Variable Coefficient  Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 8.782085  1.241578 7.073328 0.0000
RD -2.065192  0.171860 -12.01671 0.0000
R-squared  0.713440      Mean dependent var  -5.848129
Adjusted R-squared  0.708500      S.D. dependent var  3.491744
S.E. of regression  1.885219      Akaike info criterion  4.138730
Sum squared resid  206.1349      Schwarz criterion  4.208542
Log likelihood  -122.1619      Hannan-Quinn criter.  4.166037
F-statistic  144.4012      Durbin-Watson stat  0.370372










Test for Equality of Variances Between Series     
Date: 06/28/10   Time: 19:57       
Sample: 1 24         
Included observations: 24       
Method df Value Probability  
F-test (22,  22) 5890.100 0.0000  
Siegel-Tukey   5.690018 0.0000  
Bartlett 1 156.9251 0.0000  
Levene (1,  44) 59.16891 0.0000  
Brown-Forsythe (1,  44) 41.76358 0.0000  
      
Category Statistics       
      Mean Abs. Mean Abs. Mean Tukey- 
Variable Count  Std.  Dev. Mean  Diff. Median Diff. Siegel Rank 
DW 23  0.012989 0.010491 0.010018 34.78261 
DW_COMP 23  0.996882 0.835274 0.810824 12.21739 
All 46  0.697117 0.422882 0.410421 23.50000 
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Test for Equality of Variances Between Series     
Date: 06/29/10   Time: 11:51       
Sample: 25 84         
Included observations: 60       
Method df Value Probability  
F-test (59,  59) 1914.643 0.0000  
Siegel-Tukey   9.213985 0.0000  
Bartlett 1 361.0901 0.0000  
Levene (1,  118) 101.0471 0.0000  
Brown-Forsythe (1,  118) 101.0487 0.0000  
      
Category Statistics       
      Mean Abs. Mean Abs. Mean Tukey- 
Variable Count  Std.  Dev. Mean  Diff. Median Diff. Siegel Rank 
DW 60  0.021649 0.015156 0.014945 89.76667 
DW_COMP 60  0.947308 0.752063 0.752028 31.23333 
All 120  0.667320 0.383610 0.383486 60.50000 
Bartlett weighted standard deviation:  0.670023     
 
 




Test for Equality of Variances Between Series     
Date: 08/26/10   Time: 20:39       
Sample: 85 144         
Included observations: 60       
Method df Value Probability  
F-test (59,  59) 13.35708 0.0000  
Siegel-Tukey   0.784672 0.4326  
Bartlett 1 78.98917 0.0000  
Levene (1,  118) 91.84374 0.0000  
Brown-Forsythe (1,  118) 91.10082 0.0000  
      
Category Statistics       
      Mean Abs. Mean Abs. Mean Tukey- 
Variable Count  Std.  Dev. Mean  Diff. Median Diff. Siegel Rank 
DW_COMP 60  0.955403 0.786214 0.786214 63.00000 
DW 60  3.491744 3.013561 3.011324 58.00000 
All 120  3.903779 1.899887 1.898769 60.50000 
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